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ABSTRACT 
TRANSIT ION FROM HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZA nONS TO 
CONSUMER DRIVEN HEALTH PLANS:  MEASUREMENT OF INITIAL IMPACTS 
FOR MEMBERS WITH CHRONIC CONDITIONS 
By Carl F. Goff, Ph.D. 
A dissertation submitted in partial ful fi llment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Phi losophy at  Virginia Commonwealth Uni versity. 
Virginia Commonwealth Uni versity, 2007 
Major Director: Dolores G. Clement, Dr. P.H. 
Department of Health Administration, School of All ied Health Professions 
Virginia Commonwealth Uni versity 
New consumer dri ven health insurance products are designed to contain health 
care costs by making consumers more accountable for the care they recei ve through 
being responsible for more cost sharing, making decisions regarding health care providers 
they will use, and increasing exposure to and use of health information for services and 
providers. Potential benefits of consumer dri ven products include increased information 
regarding personal health and a more knowledgeable patient base. Potential drawbacks 
of consumer dri ven products include negat ive impacts on consumers with chronic and 
complex health conditions. 
The purpose of this study was to ascertain differences in health services util ization 
and health status for health plan members with diagnoses that are consistent with heart 
failure ,  coronary artery disease and/or diabetes mel litus who make the transition from a 
health plan Health  Maintenance Organization (HMO) to a Consumer Driven Health Plan 
(CDHP). Health plan members who changed plans were compared to those who 
remained in the HMO during a one year t ime period (2006).  Utilization measures 
included primary care physician visits, specialist physician visits, inpatient admissions, 
outpatient procedures and emergency room visits. Health status was measured by 
member acui ty risk scores. Selection bias was part ial l y  controlled by including only 
members who did not have a choice between an HMO or CDHP in the study. 
Logistic analysis and M ANOY A were used to obtain study results. No 
statistically  significant differences i n  uti l ization for members i n  the CDHP were seen for 
primary care visits, specialist physician visits, inpatient admissions and emergency room 
visits when compared to members in the HMO. Controll ing for age, gender, income 
level, physician coinsurance levels and acuity,  the ut i l ization of outpatient procedures 
was significantly lower in the CDHP. The i ndependent variable showing significance for 
all ut i l ization analyses was the 2006 risk score that was used as a proxy for member 
acuity .  S tudy results for comparison of changes in health status could not be obtained 
due irregularity in predicted 2007 risk scores for members in the CDHP. 
In this ini t ial study of the first year of CDHP experience, benefit design seemed to 
have l imited influence on the behavior of ind ividuals. Future studies may include 
longitudinal analyses and refinement of risk measurement techniques. 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
The development of new market-based health insurance models and products has 
been in reaction to rising health care costs and the consu mer backlash against managed 
care products. Consu mer dri ven health products are based on the assu mption that health 
care cost contain ment and quality of care i mprovements wil l  result  by maki ng consu mers 
share greater out-of-pocket costs, expanding their decisions in choices of health care 
providers and providing more exposure to health information. 
The purpose of this research is  to study health plan members with diagnoses that 
are consistent with the chronic conditions of heart failure, diabetes mell i tus and/or 
coronary artery disease who transition from a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) 
product to a Consu mer Dri ven Health Plan (CDHP) product to ascertain i f  actual changes 
in health services util ization and/or health status, and pro jected changes in health status, 
occur as a resu lt of this switch in health plans.  The pol icy ai m is to develop 
reco mmendations regarding future CDHP care programs and product design that are 
based on the results of the study. 
Potential benefits of consu mer dri ven products include better consumer 
information regarding personal health, greater consu mer responsibility for health choices 
and a more knowledgeable patient base (Harris, 2003 ) .  President Bush ' s  health policies 
have included expanding the use of h igh-deductible insurance products by allowing 
2 
individuals who set up health spending accounts to deduct the premiums they pay for 
major medical pol icies from their taxes. There wil l  be a continued push for health 
spendi ng accounts as the administration believes that they will help curb healthcare 
spending and provide more affordable health insurance products to stem the rising t ide of 
uninsured populations (Price Waterhouse Cooper, 2004). 
There are concerns regarding increased consumer cost sharing having detrimental 
impacts on access to needed care, especial ly  for those with chronic health conditions 
(Mays, Hurley & Grossman, 2(03). The high out-of-pocket cost burden that is associated 
with increased cost sharing may cause lower income people with chronic conditions to 
forgo needed care and/or force decisions regarding cost-choice tradeoffs when they are 
too sick to make an informed choice (American College of Physicians, 2004). 
The focus of this study is on the health care industry transition from managed care 
to consumer driven health products. The emphasis of the study is  on the current 
components of consumer driven health plans and their in itial impact on consumers with 
chronic and complex health conditions. This population may be influenced by multiple 
components of consumer driven health plans, including increased cost-sharing rather than 
first-dol lar coverage as experienced in  Health Maintenance Organizations, and through 
more choice of network providers, increased information regarding health care conditions 
and increased information regarding health care providers. Impacts on these consumers 
wil l  affect the long-term viabil i ty of these health plans and addit ional study in this area is 
helpful in determining potential changes to this new model for financing heal th care 
services. 
3 
This research provides an opportunity for ini ti al e valuation of new health 
insurance mechani sm s  that are expected to become models for future coverage. 
Understanding the impact on people with chronic diseases and the implicat ions for 
population health status wil l  provide valuable information for future planning for both 
commercial i n surance carriers and potential adoption of these models  in government 
programs. This research will be especially useful if these insurance models  are 
introduced to the elderly population where chronic disease conditions are more pre valent. 
Background 
Con sumer dri ven health care i s  a recent phenomenon that i s  predicated on 
increased con sumer i nvol vement in the del ivery and receipt of health care. While health 
plans have moved away from core strategies of managed care (Le sser, Ginsburg & 
Devers, 2(03),  they have also reintroduced more targeted authori zation programs and 
have al so experimented with t iered provider networks, incenti ve-based provider 
payments, i ntensi ve case management programs, predicti ve modeling appl ication s and 
increased con sumer cost sharing requirements in an effort to control premium co sts 
(Mays, Claxton & White, 2004). Health plans have recently shifted health care costs to 
consumers through expan sion of provider networks while passing d ifferences in fee 
le vels  on to the consumer through their employers by way of higher premiums, 
deductibles and co-payments (Mays, Hurley & Gro ssman, 2003 ; Robin son, 2(02).  
Rationales for thi s shift include creating reasonable consumer cost sharing to guard 
again st unreasonable expectation s for health care coverage, while also providing 
information regarding appropriate care practices, treatment alternati ves, cost of care and 
quality indicators ( KJepper & Broadsky, 2(03). 
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The concept of CDHPs is based on "defined contribution" in which employers 
provide a defined amount of money or contribution for eligible employee benefit 
coverage that wi l l  gi ve the employee a l arger stake in financial decision making 
regarding the health care that they recei ve. Some CDHPs include tiered hospital and 
physician networks with which include h igher member financial responsibility i f  they do 
not use preferred providers. Included in the concept of CDHPs is the provision of 
increased consumer information regarding health care services and health care providers. 
Init ial surveys of consumers who purchase consumer dri ven products show that 
they are higher income employees, are less l ikely to have chronic health problems and are 
more l ikely to have had no recent physician visits (Davis,  2004). An early e valuation of 
medical care costs and ut i l ization in a consumer dri ven health plan as compared to other 
health plans showed that enrollees in the consumer dri ven plans had total expenditures 
that were less that other plans after an initially favorable selection (Parente, Feldman & 
Chris, 2004). It is noted that consumers with a chronic health care condition are more 
likely to choose health plans with lower out-of-pocket responsibil i t ies (Davis, 2004).  
Identified potential problems associated with consumer dri ven products include 
adverse selection in other products (Harris,  2(03), l imited knowledge regarding the 
extent to which quali ty of care is affected by these plans, and whether or not web-based 
information and tools actually make patients beco me better consumers (LoSasso, Rice, 
Gabel & Whitmore, 2004). There are concerns regarding increased consumer cost 
sharing having detrimental impacts on access to needed care, especially for those with 
chronic health conditions (Mays, Hurley & Grossman, 2(03). 
Purpose Statement 
This study focuses on the actual ut i l ization of health care services and health 
status, and pro jected health status, for a population with chronic health conditions that 
transition from a managed care plan to consumer driven health plan. This research for 
the effects of consumer driven health plans on health care consumers with chronic 
condit ions changes inclu des the evaluation of cost-sharing and financial income 
variables. Outcomes include the ut i l ization of health services and impacts on health 
status as a result of a combination of these factors. 
Conceptual Model 
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The application of theory and conceptual research to the health industry transition 
from managed care to consumer driven health care with specific application to consumers 
with chronic health conditions introduces multiple behavioral and environmental factors. 
Social ecology theory is considered as an overarching structure for analysis of 
components that infl uence healthcare outcomes. The Andersen Behavioral Model of 
Health Services Use is used as a framework to develop an analytical model. A 
comparison of managed competition and consumerism health care models that influence 
consumer uti l ization of health care services provides detail for development of the 
analytical basis of the study. 
A comparison of the economic models of managed competition for which HMOs 
are based, and consumerism for which CDHPs are based are included in the study model :  
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I. M anaged competition su pports l imi ted consumer cost sharing economic incentives at 
the t ime of seeking care with a focus on qUali ty rather than cost. Consumerism 
su pports substantial consumer cost sharing incentives at the t ime of seeking care, 
with strong incentives to consider cost as well as qUality. 
2 .  The preferred benefit design for managed com peti t ion is  l imited consumer cost 
sharing and com prehensive coverage with modest co-payments. The preferred 
benefit design for consumerism is extensive consumer cost sharing and h igh 
deductibles with health savings accounts. 
Key research questions include :  
I .  What factors are associated with a change in  health insurance coverage from HMOs 
to COHPs for members with chronic health condi t ions? 
2. If  health services u t i l ization is  affected, is  i t  increased or decreased? 
3 .  If  health services ut i l ization is  affected, what are factors regarding consumer cost 
sharing and income level that are correlated with health services ut i l ization? 
4. If  health status changes occur, are they increased or decreased? 
5. If  health status changes occur, what are factors regarding consumer cost sharing and 
income level that are correlated with changes in health status? 
Hypotheses 
The hypotheses for this research study of members with diagnoses that are 
consistent with chronic condit ions of Heart Fai lure (HF), Coronary Artery Disease 
(CAD) and/or Diabetes Mellitus (OM) wil l  focus on outcomes differences when these 
members transition from Health Maintenance Organizations ( HMOs) to Consumer 
Driven Health Plans (CDHPs). The overall hypotheses for the study are: 
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I. Consumers who change to CDHPs and have been diagnosed with the condit ions of 
HF, DM and/or CAD wil l  have lower health services uti lization when compared with 
consumers with these conditions who remain in HMOs. 
2 .  Consumers who change to CDHPs and have been diagnosed with the conditions of 
HF, DM and/or CAD will have adverse changes i n  condition acuity when compared 
with consumers with these conditions who remain in HMOs. 
Study Design 
The study is completed through analysis of member claims data for a major health 
insurance company that admjnisters health insurance products for four mi l l ion members. 
The health insurance products to be i ncluded in the study are a HMO and a CDHP. The 
study util ized health plan claims data on a retrospect ive basis. 
The study population includes health plan members in commercial products 
between 1 8-64 years of age who have claims that are consistent with conditions of HF, 
CAD and/or DM in the HMO and the CDHP health insurance products. The control 
group consists of a sample of the study population in the HMO with diagnoses that are 
consistent with HF, CAD and/or DM. The study group consists of the study population 
in the CDHP product with diagnoses that are consistent with HF, CAD and/or DM. 
The study ut i l izes health plan claims data for the year 2006 and is designed to 
ascertain and compare in itial differences in actual health services uti lization and health 
status, and pro jected health status, for members in the health plan HMO and CDHP after 
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control ling for selection effects. Health plan members were monitored o ver a one-year 
period of time. Statist ical analyses are performed to determine if  differences exist in  
health services util ization and health status for members in the  HMO and the CDHP, and 
if independent variables relating to the products and benefit differences affect dependent 
variables that are speci fic to measuring actual health services ut i l ization and health status, 
and pro jected health status, of the members. 
S ignificance of Study 
The significance of this research is the opportunity to perform an init ial e valuation 
of new health care financing and coverage mechanisms that could proliferate and become 
the model of health care coverage in the future. This research makes a substanti ve 
contribution in that it examined consumer dri ven health plans and their impact on 
consumers with chronic and complex health conditions. Impacts to these consumers 
could ultimately result in a decline in health status for this population. Understanding the 
impact on members with chronic diseases and the impl ications for population health 
status can pro vide valuable information for future planning for both commercial 
insurance carriers and potential adoption of these models by government programs. This 
research will be espec ially useful if similar insurance models are introduced for the 
elderly population where chronic disease conditions are more prevalent. 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REV IEW 
A health care industry transition from managed care to consumer driven health 
care is intended to increase consumer cost sharing, expand consumer decisions regarding 
health care providers and increase exposure to health care information. Strategies for 
consumer dri ven health plans are based on the belief that health care services are o ver­
util ized and that gi ving financial incenti ves to consumers will induce them to seek lower 
cost pro viders and reduce the use of services with marginal value. 
The l iterature review includes the major topics of health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs), the backJash against HMOs, changes in health care economic 
models, consumer dri ven health plans (CDHPs), health care consumer attitudes, 
consumer use of medical information, consumer use of health and well ness information, 
and managed/non -managed care effects on chronic conditions. The li terature review 
provides direction for study of the health care industry transition from HMOs to CDHPs 
with a focus on i mpacts to populations with chronic health care conditions of congesti ve 
heart failure, diabetes mellitus and/or coronary artery disease. A study of cost sharing 
impacts on this population wil l  help to fi l l  to research gaps for new consumer dri ven 
health products and can provide direction for future studies. 
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Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) 
Health maintenance organizations (HMOs) provided a dramatic change for the 
health care industry in the 1980s by providing an alternative to fee-for-service (FFS) 
indemnity plans through managed care arrangements (Morrison & Luft, 1990). 
Managed care encompasses a variety of arrangements that attempt to coordinate the use 
of health care related services by utilizing primary care physicians to act as gatekeepers 
for access to specialty services through restrictions placed on reimbursements for 
specialty services (Institute of Medicine, 2(00). Managed care tools to contain health 
care costs include selective contracting to exclude inefficient providers from networks 
and capitation contracting methodologies to transfer financial·risk to providers, while 
providing comprehensive benefit packages with limited consumer-cost sharing to attract 
members and reduce financial barriers to routine health care that may alleviate the need 
for more intensive services (Mays, Hurley & Grossman, 2003). 
Managed care can be traced to a series of alternative health care arrangements that 
appeared in various communities across the country as early as the 19th century. The goal 
of these arrangements was to help meet the health care needs of select groups of people, 
including rural residents and workers and families in the lumber, mining and railroad 
industries by having enrollees pay a set fee to physicians who then delivered care under 
the terms of their agreement (Tufts Managed Care Institute, 1998). 
The growth of HMOs was stimulated by the Health Maintenance Organization 
Act of 1973, which provided federal funds for the establishment and expansion of new 
HMOs. Support for the growth of HMOs included the belief that prepaid medical care, 
as an alternative to traditional fee-for-service practice, would stimulate competition 
among health plans and enhance efficiency, which would slow the rate of health care 
expenditures (Shi & Singh, 200 1, p. 3 16). 
Organized medicine has historically opposed prepaid plans. The American 
Medical Association (AMA) was opposed to the "corporate practice" of medicine and 
worked to suppress the growth of prepaid plans and cooperatives through expelling 
physicians that participated in managed care plans from local medical societies, 
prevented them from obtaining consultations and referrals, and persuaded hospitals to 
deny them admitting privileges (Tufts Managed Care Institute, 1998). As a result of 
these actions, the AMA was indicted in 1947 and convicted of violating the Sherman 
Antitrust Act in its efforts to suppress the new plans (Tufts Managed Care Institute, 
1998). 
Provider concerns with HMOs include the oversight and potential limitation of 
tests and referrals, time constraints with patients due to limited reimbursement and 
limited identified benefits of managed care restrictions (Bovbjerg & Miller, 1999). 
Provider questioning of trustworthiness of health plans has been especially noted in for­
profit plans that are affiliated with multi-state corporations (Schlesinger, Quon, Wynia, 
Cummins & Gray, 2(05). 
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Consumer concerns regarding HMOs include perceptions of potential inadequate 
access to health care services and lower quality of care as compared to indemnity fee-for­
service health plans (Hennessy, J . ,  1999; Reschovsky, Kemper & Tu, 2000; Shi & 
Singh, 200 1, p. 343; Wilensky, 1999). One study notes that enrollees in managed care 
plans are less likely to cite financial barriers to care but are more likely to perceive 
problems in provider access, convenience and organizational factors (Reschovsky, 
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Kemper & Tu, 2(00). Patients polled between 1995 and 1997 in a survey designed by 
researchers at the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University revealed 
that 5 1  % of patients believed that their plan decreased the quality of care for sick patients 
and 55% believed that their plan might consider cost savings more important than 
optimal medical care if they became ill (Hennessy, 1999). 
Consumer concerns regarding managed care resulted in the introduction of 
legislation regarding increased oversight of HMOs. A KaiserlHarvardlPrinceton Survey 
Research Associates survey found that most insured Americans were satisfied with their 
health insurance plan but a majority of Americans favored government regulation of 
managed care, even if it raised costs (Blendon, Brodie, Benson, Altman, Levitt, Hoff and 
Hugick, 1998). A slight majority (52%) believed that government should protect 
consumers of managed care, while 40% said that such intervention is not worth the 
increased costs that would result. Fifty-nine percent said that managed care plans have 
made it harder for people who are sick to see specialists, and 55% said that they are at 
least "somewhat worried" that their health plan would be more concerned about saving 
money than what is the best medical treatment (Blendon et a!., 1998). The literature also 
suggests that some HMO plans resisted market-improving legislation, in part because 
they may have benefited from market imperfections that allowed them to attract healthy 
populations while avoiding sick populations, and contributed to negative perceptions 
regarding the managed care industry (Enthoven & Singer, 1998). 
Other reasons for member dissatisfaction with HMOs include feelings of loss of 
access and freedom when having to switch to a managed care plan involuntarily and not 
seeing health insurance premiums decrease on an individual level (Shi & Singh, 200 I, p. 
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343). Legal reaction coupled with deteriorating relationships between plans and health 
care providers caused HMO plans in many communities to loosen controls on provider 
utilization, thus causing a decline in managed care results in containing health care costs 
(Lagoe, Aspling & Westert, 2(05). 
The literature indicates that a media bias for a negative tone of reporting and a 
focus on isolated incidents of poor outcomes contributed to negative consumer 
perceptions of HMOs (Blendon et aI., 1998; Bovbjerg & Miller, 1999; Shi & Singh, 
200 1, p. 343; Wilensky, 1999). A public backlash against HMOs was fueled by 
relatively rare events that were experienced by a small number of consumers (Blendon et 
al., 1998). It was noted that the tone of media coverage became more critical over time, 
and the most visible media sources had negative stories in more than half of their 
coverage of managed care (Wilensky, 1999). 
The literature shows that a fundamental flaw in managed care was to attempt to 
control health care costs behind the scenes, as consumers were offered comprehensive 
benefit coverage but interpreted cost-control strategies as barriers to access (Robinson, 
200 I). The literature suggests that the managed care backlash represented the views and 
perceptions of providers and the media, with consumers voicing their concerns and 
causing health plans to change the structure of HMOs (Marquis, Rogowski & Escarce, 
2004). 
While media and provider negativism regarding HMOs has been documented, 
positive aspects of HMOs included a greater emphasis on primary and preventive care, 
reduced infant mortality, implementation of disease management programs and reduction 
of Caesarean sections and hysterectomies in unwarranted cases (Shi & Singh, 200 I, p. 
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343). It is noted that, while there was a modest decline in member enrollments in HMOs 
in the late 1990s, the consumer backlash against HMOs did not result in a large number 
of consumers switching to other insurance plans (Marquis, Rogowski & Escarce, 2004). 
Measurement of cost differences between HMOs and FFS indemnity plans is 
difficult due to the need to account for potential favorable selection in HMO plans. A 
study found that Medicare HMO beneficiaries in California had 18 percent lower 
inpatient days than enrollees in the traditional Medicare FFS plan. The analysis indicated 
that managed care practices accounted for 30% of the reduction in inpatient days with 
70% of the reduction being accounted for by favorable selection, and concluded that 
Medicare HMOs in California were able to reduce inpatient utilization (Dhanani, 
O'leary, Keeler, Barnezaj & Melnick, 2004). Another study found that the use of health 
care services by Medicare HMO enrollees was about four percent lower than use by 
similar traditional Medicare enrollees (Shinogle, 1997). 
Health plans have moved away from core strategies of managed care as a result of 
tight labor markets that made employers responsive to employee demands for fewer 
restrictions on access to health care, and providers gaining leverage relative to managed 
care plans (Lesser, Ginsburg & Devers, 2003). Movement away from managed care core 
strategies include expansion of provider networks, changing provider reimbursement 
mechanisms from capitation to FFS methodologies and increased consumer cost-sharing 
mechanisms (Robinson, 2002). Declines in the use HMO utilization management 
mechanisms to limit unnecessary care have also been seen as a result of potential 
litigation (Enthoven, 2003). 
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However, HMO cost containment strategies that were scaled back have re­
emerged due to large increases in health care costs that are coupled with an economic 
slowdown. Health plans have reintroduced more targeted authorization programs, and 
have also experimented with tiered provider networks, incentive based provider 
payments, intensive case management programs, predictive modeling applications and 
increased consumer cost sharing requirements in an effort to control premium costs 
(Mays, Claxton & White, 2004). These actions indicate that health plans will change 
their use of managed care tools as the nature of health plan competition relating to price, 
choice of providers and convenience changes (Mays, Hurley & Grossman, 2(03). The 
results of these strategies will depend on how they mature over a more extended time 
period (Mays, Claxton & White, 2004). 
Key-points in the literature review include that managed care offers the potential 
to control health care costs and HMOs have been successful in initiating a greater 
emphasis on primary and preventative care, and reduction of unwarranted services. 
Provider concerns with HMOs include oversight and potential limitation of tests, time 
constraints, questions of benefits for managed care limitations and a lack of 
trustworthiness of health plans that admjnister HMOs. Consumer concerns regarding 
HMOs include perceptions of inadequate access to health care services, potential lower 
quality of care and limited experience with a resulting decrease in premjums. Attempts 
to control health care costs "behind the scenes" were interpreted as limitations in access 
to care, which was fueled by a negative media bias. As a result of provider and perceived 
consumer dissatisfaction, health plans have moved away from managed care strategies, 
and have shifted to alternative health care models. 
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Contrasting Models: Managed Competition Versus Consumerism 
The literature review includes research regarding health care economic models. 
New models are being discussed and developed in reaction to perceived inadequacies in 
the current managed competition model for which HMOs are based. 
Robinson (2005) describes supply-side/managed competition incentives in 
insurance network designs as including the contractual structure of provider relationships 
that form provider payment and administrative oversight mechanisms resulting in a 
provider-centric focus. Financial incentives should be directed primarily at providers 
rather than consumers. Network designs are intended to balance reimbursing providers 
adequately to promote quality and innovation while motivating them to search for 
efficient and less costly forms of treatment. The managed competition framework raises 
skepticism concerning the consumer ability to make good financial decisions at the time 
of illness and highlights the uneven distribution of medical expenditures, where a 
majority of costs are incurred by a minority of very ill patients (Robinson, 2(05). 
Research and publication of the Community Tracking Study, a longitudinal study 
that tracks changes in local health care systems nationwide, identifies the barriers to 
efficient health systems in the managed competition model. These barriers include 
providers having excess market power over payers, the absence of potentially efficient 
provider systems due to consumer demands for large provider networks, and insufficient 
health plan competition due to higher fixed costs and legal barriers to entry for HMOs 
(Nichols, Ginsburg, Berenson, Christianson & Hurley, 2004). 
Robinson (2005) describes demand-sidelconsumerism incentives in insurance 
benefit designs as attempting to balance protecting consumers from unforeseen medical 
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expenditures while stimulating consumer choice resulting in a patient-centric focus. 
Health insurance is socially beneficial for the purpose of spreading costs of unpredictable 
illness, but also undermines consumer cost conscious choice among providers and 
procedures. Robinson (2005) states that consumerism holds an optimistic view of 
consumer ability to make cost and qUality choices at the time of seeking care and is 
skeptical concerning the role of intermediary organizations such as physician groups, 
hospital systems, vertically integrated health plans and corporate purchasers of health 
benefits. Robinson (2005) notes that the optimal consumerism insurance benefit design 
is a high-deductible indemnity umbrella, which is supported by a health services account 
that can be used for non-catastrophic expenses. 
Health plans have increased health care costs to consumers through higher 
premiums, deductibles and co-payments (Mays, Hurley & Grossman, 2003; Robinson, 
2002). Rationales for this shift include creating reasonable consumer cost sharing to 
guard against unreasonable expectations, while also providing information regarding 
appropriate care practices, treatment alternatives, cost of care and quality indicators 
(Klepper & Broadsky, 2003). 
The development of new market-based health insurance models and products has 
been in reaction to rising health care costs and the consumer backlash against managed 
care products. Health care costs grew about eight times as rapidly as everything else in 
the economy in 2002 and 2003 respectively, causing many businesses to raise employee 
health care contributions to levels that have forced some employees and dependents to 
drop from enrollment or to become underinsured (Klepper & Broadsky, 2003). In 
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reaction to this, many new product designs have included narrower benefit structures and 
higher employee cost-sharing (Sanstad, 2(0 1). 
Concerns regarding increases in consumer cost-sharing for health care include the 
potential for adverse impacts to poor and sick populations. It is noted that co-payments 
and deductibles that are not adjusted for enrollee income or health status may impose a 
greater burden on the poor and sick than on the rich and healthy populations (Robinson, 
2(02). There are concerns that new health insurance models with more consumer 
responsibility through high deductibles will not provide incentives to be cost conscious 
for high-cost consumers with chronic illnesses because their health expenses will quickly 
exceed their deductibles (Enthoven, 2(03). 
Robinson (2005) thinks that the fundamental differences between managed 
competition and consumerism are views on consumer ability to make appropriate choices 
at the time of seeking care and the utility of organizations that inform, subsidize and 
guide individual choices. He suggests that a combination of the best elements of the 
demand-side approach (consumerism) and the supply-side approach (managed 
competition) be considered in developing managed consumerism models. 
Key-points in current changes to health care economic models encompass 
movement from managed care strategies that includes expansion of provider networks 
care networks, provider reimbursement changes from capitation to FFS, a decline in 
utilization management and increased consumer cost sharing. Comparisons of supply 
side managed competition and demand side consumerism highlight differing views on 
amounts of consumer cost sharing. 
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Health plans have increasingly shifted health care costs to consumers through 
higher premiums, deductibles and co-payments. Rationales for this shift include setting 
reasonable consumer cost sharing to guard against unreasonable expectations and to 
highlight consumer responsibility. Concerns regarding increased consumer cost sharing 
include the potential for adverse effects to poor and sick populations. 
Current gaps in the literature include projected effects of increased consumer cost 
sharing as the health care industry shifts from managed care to consumerism models. 
Documentation is limited regarding effects on sicker consumers and consumers with 
lower financial income. 
Consumer Driven Health Plans (CDHPs) 
New consumer driven health plan models are predicated on the potential ability to 
contain health care costs and to enhance quality of care by making consumers more 
accountable for the care they receive through increased cost-sharing, expanding decisions 
regarding health care providers and providing increased health care information via the 
lnternet. Strategies for consumer driven health care products are based on the belief that 
some health care services are over-utilized and that giving financial incentives to 
consumers will induce them to seek lower cost providers and will reduce the use of 
services of marginal value (Davis, 2004). It is thought that by exposing consumers to the 
actual price of medical services, different options of care, appropriate information that 
will support decision making and appropriate financial incentives, they will become more 
involved and more prudent users of care to support a more efficient health care system 
(American College of Physicians, 2004). 
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The definition of a consumer driven health plan (CDHP) is fluid, but the basic 
concept is based on a defined contribution, in which employers provide a pre-defined 
amount of money or contribution for eligible employee health benefit coverage, thus 
giving employees a larger stake in financial decision-making regarding the health care 
that they purchase (Chapman & Barchet, 2(02). CDHPs can be described along a 
continuum of health plans with varying degrees of employer/sponsor and 
employee/participant responsibility, with most common models including high deductible 
catastrophic insurance with health spending accounts (American Academy of Actuaries, 
2004; Davis, 2004). Various forms of health spending accounts include health 
reimbursement accounts (HRAs), medical savings accounts (MSAs) and health savings 
accounts (HSAs). 
A HRA, which is provided by the employer, is a specified benefit amount that is 
used to pay for eligible medical expenses as defined by the employer (American 
Academy of Actuaries, 2004). An example of a consumer driven product using an HRA 
is as follows (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2(03): 
In addition to sharing the health insurance premium with employees, the employer 
places a certain amount of money each year (e.g., a defined contribution of 
$2,000) into an employee account that can be used to pay medical expenses. The 
contribution is funded directly by the employer on a pretax basis and employees 
are reimbursed up to the limit when expenses are incurred. These plans also 
include a catastrophic insurance policy with a high annual deductible (e.g., $3,500 
for a family and $ 1,500 for individuals). If the employee uses all of the $2,000 
for medical expenses, they would then be responsible for the additional $ 1,500 in 
expenses to meet the $3,500 deductible. Afterwards, the catastrophic insurance 
takes effect. Any of the $2,000 that may remain in the account at the end of the 
year would be carried over to the following year and added to the new employer 
contribution of $2,000. In some plans, remaining funds could be invested into 
portable Financial Savings Accounts. 
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MSAs are held by the employer and can be rolled over from year to year while 
building tax-free interest over time, and HSAs are held exclusively by the employee 
(American College of Physicians, 2004). Key differences between H RAs and HSAs 
include HRAs being employer funded and not typicall y  portable and HSAs bei ng funded 
by individuals that can be invested if  not used (Cigna, 2006; Society of Actuaries, 2004). 
Prevent ive services may be paid by the health plan and not from the employee account 
and high deductible plans (Chapman & Barchet, 2002) .  
The Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service ( IRS)  have provided 
guidance for health spending accounts to include definitions of medical services and 
preventat ive services, and interactions between various health spending accounts 
(Fronstin , 2004). These entities direct standards on minimal and maximum amounts for 
health savings accounts, as well as penalties for early withdrawals from these accounts 
(Fronstin, 2004; Fuchs & James, 2005) .  
Identified potential benefits of consumer driven products include better consumer 
information regarding personal health, greater consumer responsibility for health choices, 
a possibil i ty of decreased uti l ization of marginal health care services, more efficient 
administrative systems and a more knowledgeable patient base (Harris, 2003).  
Supporters of CDHPs suggest that the approaches are realistic for health care cost 
containment as, while managed care relied on decisions regarding l imitations in care 
uti l ization by second part ies, CDHPs will assign uti l ization decisions with higher cost­
sharing to the users of care (Lagoe, Aspling & Westert, 2005) .  Plans for President 
Bush 's  second term health pol icies include expanding the use of h igh-deductible 
insurance products by allowing individuals who set up health spending accounts to 
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deduct the premiums they pay for major medical policies from their taxes. There will be 
a continued push for health spending accounts, as the administration believes that they 
will help curb healthcare spending and provide more affordable health insurance products 
to stem the ris ing t ide of uninsured populations (Price Waterhouse Cooper, 2004). 
Potential problems associated with consumer driven products include adverse 
selection in other products, as a study of early experiences of firms offering consumer­
driven health care plans showed favorable selection trends when these plans are 
introduced alongside tradi tional PPO and HMO plan offerings (Harris, 2003; Buntin, 
Damberg, Haviland, Kapur, Lurie, McDevitt & Marquis, 2(06). Initial surveys of 
consumers who purchase consumer driven products show that they are higher income 
employees, are less l ikely to have chronic health problems and are more l ikely to have 
had no recent physician visits (Davis 2004). An early evaluation of medical care costs 
and util ization in a consumer driven health plan as compared to other health plans 
showed that enrollees in the consumer driven plans had total expenditures that were less 
that other plans after an i nit ially favorable selection (Parente, Feldman & Chris, 2004). It 
is noted that consumers with a chronic health care condition are more likely to choose 
health plans with lower out-of-pocket responsibil it ies (Davis, 2(04). The potential for 
healthy consumers to purchase consumer driven products and consumers with chronic 
conditions to purchase plans with lower out-of-pocket costs presents a potential selection 
bias for consumers in CDHPs and HMOs. It is noted that employers generally direct 
what types of health plans employees wil l  be able to choose which may limit selection 
bias at the member level, however selection bias may occur at the employer level. 
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There are concerns that there are wide variations in consumer abil i ty and 
preparedness to use information to navigate the health care system (Robinson, 2(0 1 ). 
There may also be l imi tations in health care consumer information for decision support 
( Rosenthal & M ilstein, 2(04). Fear of adverse risk selection and disproportionately 
greater out of pocket costs for those who are sicker or poorer has also drawn opposi t ion 
to consumer driven health plans (Gauthier & Clancy, 2004).  Additional ly,  little is known 
about the extent to which quality of care is  affected by these plans and if  web-based 
i nformation and tools actually make patients become better consumers (LoSasso, Rice, 
Gabel & Whitmore, 2004) .  Opponents of consumer driven health plans argue that the 
approach is  inferior to managed care, and that financial incentives and lnternet based 
information is not a substitute for the relationship between a patient and health care 
provider ( Lagoe, Aspl ing & Westert, 2(05) .  
There are additional concerns regarding increased consumer cost sharing having 
detrimental impacts on access to needed care, especial ly for those with chronic health 
conditions (Mays, Hurley & Grossman, 2(03) .  The high out-of-pocket cost burden that is 
associated with health spending accounts may cause lower income people with chronic 
conditions to forgo needed care and/or force decisions regarding cost-choice tradeoffs 
when they are too sick to make an informed choice (American College of Physicians, 
2004). One study states that only a minority of health plans report that they monitor 
claims to protect against under-use of health services (Rosenthal & Milstein, 2004).  
I t  is  noted that five percent of the population use a majority of al l  dol lars that  are 
generated on health care, and that a high deductible may not have an impact on health 
care spending for this population (Halvorson, 2004). Robinson (2004 ) notes that 
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consumers with chronic medical conditions such as asthma, diabetes and congestive heart 
failure are usually in frequent need of cl inical services and will have to pay considerable 
amounts of money before reaching their i nsurance product out-of-pocket maximum. Thjs 
may stimulate a consumer backlash against consumer driven health plans when 
consumers refuse needed health care services when faced with high deductibles and 
network tiers (Robinson, 2004) .  Thorpe (2005) states that a reliance solely on a 
consumer-driven model wi l l  not address key factors in health care spending, and this 
model does not address public health and prevention interventions at the popu lation level .  
A study of initial experience with consumer driven health plans in Switzerland 
suggests that to attain universal access, i t  is necessary to require individual purchase of 
health insurance of all people and to provide financial subsidies for people who cannot 
afford premiums ( Herzlinger & Parsa-Parsi ,  2004).  Other suggestions if consumer 
driven plans are implemented in the United States include permitting experimentation in  
coverage to allow risk-adjustment to  reflect risk status, to  reward efficient and effective 
providers and to disseminate risk-adjusted provider results to consumers (Herzlinger & 
Parsa-Parsi, 2004).  
The first Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI)/Comrnonwealth Fund 
Consumerism in  Health Care Survey (2005) for high deductible plans ($ 1 ,000 or more for 
individual plans and $2,000 or more for farlli l y  plans) found lower consumer sat isfaction 
with consumer driven plans. Individuals with more comprehensive health insurance were 
more satisfied with their health plan and, despite simi lar rates of health care use, 
individuals in consumer driven plans were more l ikely to spend a large share of their 
income on out-of-pocket health care expenses than those in comprehensive health plans. 
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Individuals in consumer driven plans were more l ikely  to avoid, skip or delay health care 
than those wi th more comprehensive health insurance, with problems being more 
pronounced wi th individuals with health problems or annual incomes under $50,000. For 
individuals who did receive care, there was evidence that they are more cost-conscious 
than those in  comprehensive health plans. 
The National Counci l  on Disab i li ty (2004) has stated that l i terature in the field of 
consumer directed health care is  l imited and many of the programs that test the models 
are too small to yield defini ti ve data. However, despite the l imi tations in research they 
support the changes in payment of long-term-care of individuals with disabil i t ies and feel 
that consumer direction indicates posit ive outcomes in consumer satisfaction, quality of 
l i fe and perceived empowerment with no evidence of patient safety being compromised. 
A study by the United States Government Accountabil i ty Office (2006) estimated 
that health spending account eligible plan enrollees would incur h igher annual costs than 
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) plan enrollees for extensive use of health care, but 
would incur lower annual costs than PPO plan enrollees for low to moderate use of health 
care. Most health spending account  el igible plan enrollees were satisfied with their plan 
and would recommend them to healthy consumers, but not those who use maintenance 
medication, have a chronic condition, have children, or may not have the funds to meet 
h igh deductibles. 
Ini t ial health services research speculates that there are benefits in greater 
consumer involvement in health care, but does not indicate that consumer-driven health 
plans are a panacea for reducing health care cost (Nichols, Ginsburg, Berenson, 
Christianson & Hurley, 2004). More research is  needed on a broad range of benefit 
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designs to test for effects among vulnerable populations and measures of changes in 
patterns of health care ut i l ization (Buntin, Oamberg, Haviland, Kapur, Lurie, Mcdevitt & 
Marquis, 2(06). It is  noted that consumerism in  health care and associated insurance 
products are new, and as with most new ideas the in i ti al models and products wil l  need to 
be revised and improved as prototype designs are almost never without flaws (Scandlen, 
2004). 
Key-points around COHPs include that these products are based on the consumer 
health care economic model . Strategies for COHPs are based on the belief that health 
care services are over-uti l ized and that giving financial incentives to consumers wil l  
induce them to seek lower cost providers and reduce the use of services with marginal 
value. Included in the concept of COHPs is  the provision of increased consumer 
information regarding health care services and health care providers. Identified potential 
benefits of COHPs include the potential for better consumer information regarding 
personal health, greater consumer responsibi l i ty for health choices, a possibil i ty of 
decreased ut i l ization of marginal health care services and a more knowledgeable patient 
base. Potential problems that are associated with COHPs include differing abil i ties of 
individuals to gather and evaluate information, adverse selection in  other products and 
increased cost sharing having detrimental effects on access to needed care, especially for 
those with chronic health conditions and/or those with l imited financial income. 
Limitations in l i terature and research regarding COHPs include impacts to consumers 
with chronic health conditions and actual use of information by consumers. 
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CDHPs and Health Care Consumer Attitudes 
Strategies around COHPs are based on the concepts of moral hazard and 
asymmetric information. Moral hazard refers to the increased use of services when 
pooling of risks leads to decreased marginal price, which creates differing tendencies of 
people with health insurance to maximize the use of health services (Fol land,  Goodman 
& Stano, 2004, p. 1 59- 1 6 1 ;  Stewart, 1 994 ) .  By not knowing the fu ll cost that is 
associated with health care, consumers can demand more and overuse health care 
services (Thorpe, 2005) .  Asymmetric i nformation refers to a lack of information for 
health care consumers, in that they are often poorly informed compared to the provider 
about their condition, available treatments, expected outcomes and prices charged by 
other providers (Folland, Goodman & Stano, 2004, P. 1 89) .  
Oowd (2005) states that COHPs attempt to reduce inefficient moral hazard 
through a large deductible that requires enrollees to spend a substantial amount of their 
own money before the insurance company begins to pay for health services. The Rand 
Health Insurance Experiment in the 1 970s tested the effects of health insurance cost 
sharing on consumer use of medical services and heal th .  Participants in the study were 
randomly assigned to either free health care or to one of four cost sharing plans for three 
to five years. Key findings of the RAND study include: (Keeler, 1 992) 
I. Health care cost sharing reduces health care spending. It was est imated that people 
without health insurance wil l  ut i l ize half as much health care than people with free 
health care. There was no evidence that cost sharing would become less effective 
over t ime due to unmet health care needs. 
2. Cost sharing lowered dol lars spent and quant i ty of use at equal rates. Cost sharing 
works to reduce the amount of services used, not in finding lower prices. 
3 .  People with cost sharing do not  just cu t  out  nonessentials. Despite the  higher 
ut i l ization rates with free care, the proportion of hospitalizations that were 
i nappropriate was almost identical for both cost sharing and free plans, as was the 
inappropriate use of antibiotics. 
4. R ich and poor people had similar reductions with cost sharing. However, poor 
people were less l ikely  to seek care in a year, but were also more likely to be 
hospitalized. 
28 
5 .  People given free care had better health results a t  the end of  the study on blood 
pressure control, corrected vision, and oral health, especial ly  for the poor and i ni tial ly  
sick. Better blood pressure control wi th  free care was due to  better case finding, as  i t  
was detected in the extra visi ts induced by free care. An examination of other 
conditions showed no significant health differences between those with free care and 
those with cost sharing. 
While the RAND Health Insurance Experiment demonstrated that if patients pay 
more health care bil ls directly out of pocket they wi l l  consume less health care, the 
experiment excluded people over 62 years of age and those who were totally disabled 
(Davis, 2004). The experiment showed negative impact on health for those who are at 
h igh medical risk, particularly if they are also of lower income (Gruber, 2(06).  The 
experiment found that the use of physician services was more sensit ive to cost sharing 
than the use of hospital services, but what is less well known are effects on health status 
and use of cl inically appropriate or inappropriate services which suggests the importance 
of examining whether a reduction in util ization is inappropriate and whether there are 
adverse health consequences (Davis, 2004). 
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Concerns regarding h igher member cost-sharing and associated under-use of 
medical care are represented by an AARP Nebraska survey that showed that one of three 
people over the age of 50 were cutting back on medications to cope with drug costs 
(Gangul i ,  2(03) .  A study of the impact of patient cost sharing on the use of services and 
resulting health status impacts for a population aged 65 and older showed that having 
some form of supplemental i nsurance is  associated with more appropriate health care use, 
particu larly when this insurance provides coverage for prescription medication (Rice & 
Matsuoka, 2004). 
Regina Herzlinger (2004), an early proponent of consumer driven health-care, 
believes that the concept of CDHPs is dependent on consumers and providers creating 
health care services that best meet their needs through differentiated health plans. She 
believes that consumer choice increases satisfaction, enhances motivation and i mproves 
performance. Important assumptions regarding choice in consumer driven health plans 
include that providers will increase consumer choice because of identified posit ive 
aspects and insurers wi l l  increase choice among attributes that consumers consider to be 
important to them (Herzlinger, 2004, p. 97-98) .  
Herzlinger states that enabling consumers to  evaluate health insurance as  if  they 
were using their own money wil l  help to curb health care costs (Herzlinger, 2003, p. 75) .  
However, questions are raised regarding effects of member access to care and 
medications in a study to evaluate the impact of managed care on the use of chronic 
disease medications. Stafford, Davidson, Davidson, Miracle-McMahi l l ,  Crawford & 
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B lumenthal (2003) showed that chronic disease patients in managed care plans are more 
l ikely to recei ve expensive medications as compared to less use of expensive medications 
in  indemnity plans. Noted differences may be explained by members in indemnity plans 
facing higher out-of-pocket costs. 
Key-points around CDHPs and health care consumer attitudes include that 
CDHPs attempt to affect consumer atti tudes regarding health care spending through 
h igher cost sharing and increased exposure to health care i nformation. It is  thought that 
increased cost sharing wil l  lower unnecessary health care ut i l ization. The RAND study 
ind icates that increased consumer cost sharing decreases consumer health care spending. 
However, there are concerns regarding h igher consumer cost sharing and associated 
under-use of needed medical care. 
Health Care Consumer Use of Medical lnformation 
A review of studies for patient activation to make more prudent health care 
choices when they are given financial incentives with access to comparative cost and 
quality information by H ibbard, Stockard, Mahoney and Tusler (2004) showed patient 
engagement and act ive participation in care being l inked to better health outcomes. They 
summarize that patients who are able to self manage symptoms and problems, engage in 
act ivities that maintain functioning, be involved in  treatment and diagnostic choices, 
collaborate with prov iders, select providers based on performance or quality and navigate 
the health care system are l ikely  to have better health outcomes. 
Harris (2003 ) showed that despite predictions of the i ncreasing importance of 
consumer choice in shaping the health care delivery system, the image of patients as 
passive health care consumers of physician services tends to be true with poor health 
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status, higher levels of service use in  the past year, and stronger ties to individual 
physicians being associated with less consumer activism. Higher levels of consumer 
act ivism were found among racial and ethic minorities, among those who report using 
information to choose their physicians and among those who switched physicians as a 
result of dissatisfaction some time in the past five years (Harris, 2003) .  While Schulz, 
Call, Feldman and Christianson (200 1 )  showed that consumers who changed to a new 
provider group were more l ikely to use report card. information and find it useful ,  Longo 
(2004) showed that there is l ittle empirical evidence on how consumer reports are used by 
employers to make health care purchasing decisions. Hurley ( 1 997) notes the feature of 
the changing interface between employers and providers involving the consumer role in  
the  decision process seems to  be struggling wi th  developing and adopting a consumer 
orientation rather than communicating to consumers the criteria, expectations and biases 
of professional perspectives. 
A study (Murray, Lo, Pollack & Donelan, 2003) to determine physician views of 
effects of direct to consumer (DTC) advertising on health service uti l ization, quali ty of 
care and the doctor-patient relationship showed that more than half (56%) of patients who 
discussed information from direct-advertising in  a visit did so because they wanted a 
specific intervention. The physician deemed 49% of these requests to be clinically 
inappropriate. This effect on the doctor-patient relationship eventuall y  led the physician 
to do what the patient wanted . Conclusions were that DTC advert ising can have both 
posit ive and negative effects on quality of care, the doctor-patient relationship and health 
service uti l ization. The benefits may be maximized by increasing the accuracy of 
information in advertisements, enhancing physician communication and negotiation skills 
and encouraging patients to respect physician cl inical expertise (Murray, Lo, Pollack & 
Donelan, 2(03).  
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Vale and Yamamoto (2004) found that the attitudes of oncology nurse 
practitioners were similar to those in previous studies of physicians regarding the number 
of visits when patients requested DTC advertised medications. However, major 
differences were seen in the positive attitudes of the practitioners toward potential l y  
longer patient visits to  explain and educate patients regarding medication requests based 
on DTC advertising, and smaller percentages of practitioners felt pressured to prescribe 
requested medications. The practitioners considered patient encounters for educational 
purposes as appropriate and included information about requested DTC-advertised 
medications in their approach to patient care (Vale & Yamamoto, 2004). 
Vogel, Ramachandran and Zachry (2003) showed that mass media DTC 
advertising of prescription drugs has emerged as a successful advertising strategy. 
Opponents argue that DTC advertising provides misleading messages rather than well 
balanced and evidence-based information. Their conclusions were that direct consumer 
advert ising indirectly affects the price and quantity of production of pharmaceuticals via 
its effect on changes in consumer demand (Vogel, Ramachandran & Zachry, 2(03) .  
Key-points around CDHPs and increased use of  medical information include 
potential positive health outcomes through consumer activation with consumer 
involvement and collaboration with providers regarding treatment choices. However, 
there are questions regarding the impact and appropriateness of increased use of medical 
information that is available to consumers. 
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Consumer Use of Health and Wel l  ness Information 
Strategies for consumer driven healthcare include providing consumers wi th 
information regarding health and well ness information. It is thought that by exposing 
consumers to the actual price of medical services, different  options of care, appropriate 
information that wil l  support decis ion making and appropriate financial incenti ves, they 
will become more involved and more prudent users of care to support a more effic ient 
health care system (American College of Physicians, 2004). Kyrouz, Holt, Mittman & 
Everett ( 1 998) suggest that consumers are beginning to take on more health 
responsibi l i ties such as gathering more information about health, d isease, treatments, 
prevention and health impacts of products. This i s  expected to . initiate a shift in  the self­
perception of patients from passive recipients of medical care to active consumers of 
health serv ices, including a cultural shift that changes the dynamics of the physician and 
patient relationshi p. 
Herzl inger (2004) notes that the primary care system does not do enough in the 
area of disease prevention, especially in addressing the needs of the whole person-body, 
mind, heart and spirit. She thinks that the health care system must do more to encourage 
people to modify their l i festyles and behaviors to prevent disease (Herzlinger, 2004, p. 
206). H ibbard (2004) identifies that provider quality of care measurements have not kept 
pace with policy approaches that rely on patients to contain costs and improve qual ity, 
and that qual ity measures that focus on patient self-management abi l i ties that are 
integrated into the measurement of processes of care have not been developed. 
Kane, Johnson, Town and Butler (2004) evaluated evidence of the impact of 
economic incentives on consumer adoption of preventive health behaviors and 
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determined that economic incentives for prevention appear to work, but their mechanisms 
are not well understood. Economic incent ives appear to be effect ive in  the short run for 
simple preventive care and distinct, well-defined behavioral goals. However, there i s  less 
evidence that economic i ncentives can sustain the long-term l i festyle changes requ ired 
for health promotion. Small incentives can produce finite changes, but it is not clear 
what size of incentive is needed to yield a major sustained effect .  
Earlier studies predicted that health care consumer access to the Internet would be 
an important issue for the health care industry because health care organizations that 
would be able to provide information through the Internet would have a competitive 
advantage. However, it was also identi fied that, while many people would use the 
Internet to become more sophisticated health care consumers, a large segment of the 
population would not benefit from Internet self-education opportunit ies because they do 
not have the access to do so. One study noted that many people not only lack a Internet 
device, they also may not know how to find public access to the Internet, are afraid of 
computers and technology, or have a physical, geographic or financial l imitation 
preventing them from tapping into the Internet (Wilkins, 1 999). However, recent RAND 
and Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association surveys show that consumer main sources of 
health information come from the Internet and their personal physician (Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield Association, 2(06). 
A major concern about the widespread use of interactive Web-based technologies 
is the volume of unendorsed, non-validated, misleading, fraudulent and potentially 
harmful health information available over the Internet (Rodrigues, 2(00) .  A study to 
systematically review the effect of consumer use of online health information on 
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decision-making, att itudes, knowledge, satisfaction, health outcomes and ut i l ization 
concluded that despite widespread Internet use to obtain health care information, there is 
almost a complete lack of evidence of any effects this may have on health outcomes 
(Bessell ,  McDonald, S ilagy, Anderson, Hi l ler & Sansom, 2(02) .  
Herzlinger (2004) notes the prevail ing opinion that the cost effect iveness of an 
informed consumer strategy cannot be demonstrated as there are concerns that 
uncontrolled consumers wil l  drive up health care costs through unconstrained demand 
without corresponding cost consciousness. This creates the need for the development of 
mechanisms to create an economic balance between unrestricted and unaffordable 
demand ( Herzlinger, 2004, p. 424) .  
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has defined health 
l i teracy as a constellation of skil ls that constitute the abi l ity to perform basic reading and 
numerical tasks for functioning in the health care environment and acting on health care 
information (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2004). Other definitions 
consider health l i teracy i ssues that go beyond basic skil ls to include health information 
communication, l iteracy and health as cultural and social practices, the relationship with 
health information l i teracy and behavior, and the impact of the Internet on the use of 
health information ( Kerka, 2(03) .  
The AHRQ reports that low l i teracy may impair functioning in the health care 
environment, affect patient-physician communication dynamics and inadvertently lead to 
substandard medical care. It is associated with poor understanding of written or spoken 
medical advice, adverse health outcomes and negative effects on the health of the 
population (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2004).  Hibbard, Greene and 
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Tusler (2005) report that low health l i teracy has been l inked with higher rates of 
hospitalization, lower use of preventive care, less effective sel f  management of chronic 
condi tions and poor health habits with estimated costs to the health care system between 
$30 bi l l ion and $73 bil l ion annually. 
A report was developed by the US Department of Education to i l luminate the 
relationship between l i teracy and health using information from large-scale surveys of 
adult  l i teracy (Nat ional Adult Literacy Survey and International Adult Li teracy Survey, 
2(03) .  Included in the assessments were a variety of health related materials on topics 
such as drugs and alcohol, d isease prevention and treatment, safety and accident 
prevention, first aid, emergencies and staying healthy .  The assessments showed the 
fol lowing results (Rudd, Kirsch & Yamamoto, 2004):  
I .  Results for the total population showed that 1 2% of the U S  adult population i s  
estimated t o  have skills in the lowest level o f  adu l t  health l i teracy, while a n  additional 
7% can be expected to have great difficulty performing simple tasks with a high 
degree of proficiency. 
2 .  Results for selected vulnerable or  at-risk groups showed that health l i teracy i s  
strongly related to  educational attainment. The average score of adults who had not 
completed h igh school or earned a GED at the t ime of the survey was far lower than 
that of individuals who had graduated from high school or earned a GED and for 
those who had continued their education beyond high school. 
3 .  Resu lts for U . S .  health l i teracy proficiency and multiple characteristics showed that, 
on average, working adults who reported having additional assets such as income 
from savings or dividends had the h ighest l i teracy scores, and retired adults l iv ing 
below the poverty level had the lowest scores. 
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The AHRQ (2004) states that the concept of health l iteracy and its role in health care 
use and health outcomes wil l  need further evaluation. The current l i terature focuses only 
on reading abil i ty and health, but taking a patient-centered approach that addresses 
challenges in navigating the health care system and providing self-care may enrich 
understanding of health l iteracy and ul t imately how to measure and improve i t  (Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2004). 
Key-points regarding CDHPs and consumer use of health and wel l  ness 
information include the need for the healthcare system to encourage l i festyle 
modification. There are questions regarding the consumer use of healthlwellness 
economic i ncent ives and use of information. While use of the Internet for healthcare 
information i s  increasing, there are questions regarding consumer access and qual ity of 
information that is  provided. 
There are overall questions regarding i f  consumers can understand health 
information, where they wil l  recei ve it from, and if they wil l  act ively use the information. 
Low health l i teracy has been l inked with higher rates of hospitalization, lower use of 
prevent ive care, less effective self-management of chronic conditions and poor health 
habits. There is  a high interest in the measurement of health l i teracy, with recent efforts 
attempting to develop shorter tests than what currently exist to be used in the cl inical 
setting. 
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Managed Care and Non-Managed Care Effects on Chronic Conditions 
While the question of higher member responsibil ity and use of inforn1ation for the 
majority of health care consumers with lower health acuity levels is pertinent, the impact 
of these components on consumers with h igher health acuity levels is more important as 
this may determine the overall effectiveness of consumer driven health care. Research on 
the outcomes of patients with chronic conditions in managed care and non-managed care 
models shows mixed results. While Wholey, Bums and Lavizzo-Mourey ( 1 998) found 
that access to primary care in  managed care organizations is better but access to 
specialists and hospitals is more difficult, Wang & Pauly (2003) concluded that enrollees 
in HMOs used more preventive services than enrol lees in fee-for-service (FFS) plans. A 
four-year observational study of 2,235 patients (age 1 8  to 97) with hypertension, non­
insul in  dependent diabetes, recent acute myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure 
and depressive disorder indicated that physical and mental health did not differ for 
average patients in an H MO versus a FFS plan, but concluded that elderly and poor 
chronical ly ill patients had worse physical health outcomes in the HMO than in FFS 
systems (Ware, Bayliss, Rogers, Kosinski & Tarlov, 1 996). Yelin, Criswell and 
Feigenbaum ( 1 996) could find no evidence that persons with rheumatoid arthritis in FFS 
and prepaid group practice settings received d ifferent quantities of health care or 
experienced different outcomes on either an annual or long-term basis. Greenfield, 
Rogers, Mangotich, Carney and Tarlov ( 1 995) found no meaningful differences for 
health outcomes of patients with hypertension and non-insul in dependent diabetes over a 
seven-year period for patients treated by managed care systems or by different specialists. 
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Luft (2003) states the need to move beyond simple comparisons of FFS versus 
HMOs to deeper analyses of the reasons for performance differences, in that there is 
substantial variation in practice pattern differences in FFS plans and that variation across 
HMOs is not due only to financial arrangements. He believes that specific practice 
gu idelines, qual i ty review and other features should also be examined, in that differential 
practice patterns and better outcomes in some plans may also be due to different 
physicians and hospitals. 
Chronic diseases claim the l ives of more than 1 .7 mil l ion Americans annually, 
with ten percent of Americans being l imited in their dai ly activities by these diseases 
(Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, 2(06).  Important chronic conditions to be 
considered in the analysis of COHPs include congestive heart fai lure, diabetes mellitus 
and coronary artery disease. 
Congestive heart fai lure (CHF) is recognized as a major chronic condition 
through both high prevalence and costs. Approximately 2% of the population in the age 
range of 40-59, 5% in the age range of 60-69 and 1 0% of Americans over the age of 70 
have CHF. There are over 400,000 new cases of CHF annually. It has been estimated 
that health care costs for CHF are over $23 bill ion per year. Half of the number of 
patients diagnosed with CHF wil l  die within five years (Statistics About Congestive 
Heart Failure, 2(03 ). 
Diabetes mellitus (OM )  is a chronic medical condition that is the third leading 
cause of death behind heart disease and cancer (Mathur, 2(05 ) .  Approximately 1 8  
mill ion people in the United States have diabetes, with direct and indirect costs totaling 
$ 1 32 billion (Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, 2(06). OM is a risk factor for 
CHF. Aronow and Ahn ( 1 999) showed that patients with OM have a 1 . 3 t imes hjgher 
chance of developing CHF than those without OM . Guazzi ,  Brambil la, De Vita & 
Guazzi (2002) showed that patients with OM have a four-to-fivefold increased risk of 
CHF, and in the case of co-morbidity, aggravates the lung dysfunction that frequently 
accompanies CHF which produces a synergistic rather than a simple addit ive effect .  
Coronary artery disease (CAD) is  a chronic process that begins during 
adolescence and slowly progresses throughout l i fe. It  is responsible for one rlli l l ion 
deaths per year in  the United States . The estimated prevalence of CAD in men is 6.9% 
and 6.0% in women (Rimmerman, 2(05) .  In 1 992 the American Heart Associat ion 
estimated the total direct and indirect costs of CAD to be $94.5. bi ll ion (Deckelbaum, 
1 992). 
40 
Key-points regarding the comparison of people with chronic health conditions in 
managed care and non-managed care models is  that mixed outcomes results are shown. 
Study resu lts range from HMOs showing better and poorer results than fee-for-service 
plans, to having sirlli lar results between plan types. It is noted that measurement of 
outcomes is  difficult due to mult iple factors, other than just plan financial arrangements, 
that can influence changes in health status. Major chronic conditions include heart 
failure, diabetes mel litus and coronary artery disease. 
Literature Summary and Direction of Study 
The l i terature review indicates that there is  a health care industry transition from 
managed care to consumer driven health care that intends to increase consumer cost 
sharing, expand decisions regarding health care providers and increase exposure to health 
care information. Strategies for CDHPs are based on the bel ief that health care services 
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are over-uti l ized, and that giving financial incentives to consumers wil l  induce them to 
reduce the use of services with marginal value. The concept of CDHPs is  based on 
defined contribution, in which employers provide a defined amount of money or 
contribution for el igible employee benefit coverage that wi l l  give the employee a larger 
stake in financial decision making regarding the health care that they receive. Original 
concepts underlying the development of CDHPs included increased consumerism and use 
of information to help consumers make health care choices. 
Ident ified potential benefits of CDHPs include better consumer information 
regarding personal health, greater consumer responsibil i ty for health choices, a possibi l i ty 
of decreased uti l ization of marginal health care services, and a more knowledgeable 
patient base. Potential problems that are associated with CDHPs include the differing 
abi l i t ies of individuals to gather and evaluate information and adverse selection in  other 
products. Addit ionally, increased cost sharing may have detrimental effects on access to 
needed care, especial ly for those with chronic health conditions. 
Noted knowledge gaps include CDHP impacts on consumers with chronic health 
conditions and impacts on consumers that have lower financial incomes. While the Rand 
Study provides information regarding effects on differences in cost sharing and potential 
effects on poorer populations, the l i terature is lacking in regard to increased consumer 
cost sharing in populations with chronic health conditions. 
The l i terature review indicates that consumer driven health care is  a very recent 
phenomenon that is  predicated on increased consumer involvement in the del ivery of 
health care. Research gaps include the impact of increased cost sharing on consumers 
with chronic health condit ions and/or consumers with lower financial income. There are 
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questions regarding what overall quality and cost impacts will occur for consumers with 
complex and/or chronic health conditions as a result of h igher cost-sharing responsibil i ty .  
The emphasis of this study wil l  be on consumer driven health plans and their  
impact on consumers with chronic health conditions of CHF, OM and/or CAD. This 
population may be affected by multiple components of COHPs, to include increased cost­
sharing through no first-dollar coverage as experienced in HMOs, more choice of 
network providers, increased information regard ing health care condi t ions and increased 
information regardi ng health care providers. While many factors can influence health 
outcomes, the focus of the study will be on the effects of increased cost sharing on health 
outcomes for people with chronic health condit ions when they transition from an HMO to 
a COHP. 
Impacts to these consumers will affect the long-term viabil i ty of consumer driven 
health plans and addit ional study in  this area will be helpful in determining potential 
changes to the consumerism health care economic model. This study will contribute to 
research gaps regarding COHP consumer cost sharing and impacts to people with chronic 
health condit ions that can provide information that can be used in  future studies. This 
information wil l  be espec ially useful i f  these insurance models are introduced to the 
elderly population where chronic diseases are more prevalent. 
The review of theory and conceptual research in  chapter three will provide an 
overall framework of the identi fied components of consumer driven health care. A 
comparison of managed competitionIHMOs and consumerism/COHPs focusing on 
d ifferences in cost sharing wil l  provide direction for the study of consumers with heart 
fai lure, d iabetes mellitus and/or coronary artery disease. 
CHAPTER THREE: THEORY AND CONCEPTUAL RESEARCH REVIEW 
The application of theory and conceptual research to the health care industry 
transition from managed care to consumer driven health care with specific application to 
consumers with chronic conditions will need to include not only the study of health plan 
member behavior changes due to more responsibil i ty in the use of health plan benefits, 
but also the introduction of environmental factors that are beyond the scope of behavioral 
theory alone. Social ecology theory is considered as an overarching structure for analysis 
of components that influence healthcare outcomes. The Andersen behavioral model of 
health services use is  used as a framework to develop an analytical model. A comparison 
of managed competition and consumerism health care models that i nfluence consumer 
uti l ization of health care services provides detail to develop the analytical basis of the 
study. The comparison of consumer cost sharing based on prior research of health 
coverage benefits is used to develop hypotheses for samples of consumers enrolled in  
HMOs and CDHPs with heart failure (HF) ,  diabetes mell i tus (DM) and/or coronary 
artery d isease (CAD). 
Social Ecology Theory 
Social ecology theory can be helpful in framing mUltiple variables of consumer 
driven health plans, the interaction between the variables and their ul timate impact on 
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members with chronic health conditions. Assumptions of Social Ecology Theory 
include: (Whiteley, 1 999) 
1 .  Health promotion is based on an understanding of the dynamic interplay among 
diverse environmental and personal factors. 
2. The incorporation of multiple levels of analysis and d iverse methodologies. 
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3. The application of systems theory to take into account both the interdependencies that 
exist among i ntermediate and more d istant environments, and the dynamic 
interrelations between people and their environments. 
Stokols ( 1 996) notes that social ecology theory provides a framework to 
understand the dynamic interaction of intra-personal and environmental factors in  health 
and i l lness, and emphasizes the importance of conducting longitudinal evaluations of 
intervention outcomes and effectiveness. He states that in view of the interdisciplinary 
foundations and multi-sectoral design of ecological interventions, the evaluation of 
program outcomes will require different behavioral, environmental and health indices 
(Stokols, 1 996). 
Grzywacz and Fuqua (2000) state that the ecological perspective is characterized 
by different dimensions of well-being, with certain individual or environmental 
condit ions that exert a disproportionate amount of influence on health and well-being 
which then become leverage points. Stokols (2000) states that the increased use of an 
ecological orientation stems from a growing recognition that most public health 
challenges are too complex to be understood adequately from single levels of analysis, 
and instead require more comprehensive approaches. He states that researchers and 
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practitioners should ident ify and give top priority to high-leverage variables, or those that 
exert the greatest influence on well-being across multiple levels of analysis, which 
includes the use of diverse research methods such as qualitative and quantitat ive 
measures, formative and summative eval uation strategies, interrupted time-series designs 
and h ierarchical l inear modeling. 
Andersen Model 
The framework for the proposed study wil l  be based on the Andersen behavioral 
model of health services use. The model is an ecological application that i l lustrates the 
dynamic interaction of individual use of health services, and is a reflection of the 
conceptualization of the premises of social ecology theory. The Andersen model was 
init ial ly  developed in the 1 960s to assist in the understanding of use of health services, to 
define and measure equitable access to health care, to assist in developing policies and to 
promote equitable access (Andersen, 1 995) .  The init ial model included predisposing 
characteristics (demographics, social and health belief variables), enabling resources 
(personal/fami ly and community variables) and need (perceived and evaluated) 
components that result  in the use of health services (Andersen, 1 995) .  The model 
evolved in the 1 980s and 1 990s to include primary determinants of health behavior, 
actual health behavior and health outcomes. 
Andersen has developed the behavioral model of health services use to stress 
contextual and individual characteristics (Andersen, 2006). Both contextual and 
individual characteristics include predisposing, enabl ing and need components that result 
in  health behaviors that ult imately result in health outcomes. The model is represented in 
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Figure I which demonstrates the interdependencies of contextual and i ndividual 
characteristics, health behaviors and outcomes. This is consistent wi th the social ecology 
theory premise that health promotion is  based on understanding of dynamic interplay 
among diverse environmental and personal factors (Whitley, 1 999). 
A Behavioral lVIodeI of Health Services Use 
Stressing Contextual as well as Individual Characteristics 
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Figure I: Andersen Behavioral Model of Health Services Use (Andersen, 2006). Used 
with permjssion from author. 
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Andersen Model Application to Consumer Driven Health Care 
Member transition from managed care products to consumer directed products 
encompasses multiple interrelated variables that can influence health outcomes. These 
variables include health status and co-morbid conditions, financial abi l ity to access 
needed services, demographics of consumers, changes in provider networks, use of health 
information, behavioral attitudes toward healthcare and health care behaviors. The study 
of interrelationships between these variables and their influences on health outcomes i s  
needed to understand the potential impacts of CDHPs .  
Increased member cost sharing in  consumer driven health care is a individual 
characteristic that may have negative impacts on health outcomes of individual members 
who have been diagnosed with chronic health conditions. Robinson (2002) notes 
concerns regarding increases in consumer cost-sharing for health care that can create 
adverse impacts on poor and sick populations, such as co-payments and deductibles that 
are not adjusted for member income or health status.  The high out-of-pocket cost burden 
that is associated with consumer driven health plans may cause lower income people with 
chronic condi t ions to forgo needed care and/or force decisions regarding cost-choice 
tradeoffs when they are too sick to make an informed choice (American College of 
Physicians, 2004). 
Strategies for consumer driven healthcare include providing consumers with 
information regarding health care provider cost and quality indicators ( Herzlinger, 2004, 
p. 76, 1 68) .  Consumer attitudes regarding the use of health care providers wi l l  be based 
on trust in the entity that provides the information (Balkrishnan, Hall, Blackwelder & 
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Bradley, 2004).  Harris (2002) states that consumers will  trade h igh quality for 
restrictions on provider access, but these differences in quality wil l  need to be significant. 
loSasso, Rice, Gabel and Whitmore (2004) and Robinson (200 1 )  indicate that 
there are wide variations in  consumer abi l ity and preparedness to use information to 
navigate the health care system. Attitudes concerning the use of health information may 
be variable for individual consumers. It is  noted that there is l ittle empirical evidence on 
how consumers use information in  making health care purchasing decisions and how 
economic incentives can sustain long-term l ifestyle changes ( Kane, Johnson, Town & 
Butler, 2004; Longo, 2(04).  
While behaviors can be influenced by peer experience in  increased provider 
interaction, providers may be considered as important individuals that wil l  influence 
normative bel iefs. Providers have h istorically driven decisions regarding health care with 
l ittle questioning by consumers, and the authority of providers appears to be an important 
element in init iating and sustaining patient behavior change (Center For The 
Advancement of Health, 2(00) .  Barriers to consumers being able to influence the health 
care system through i ncreased provider interaction include gaps in information and 
authori ty between consumers and providers, the infrequency of health care purchases and 
consumer vulnerabil i ty when health services are needed (Mil ler, 200 I ) . 
While the l i terature suggests that health care consumers are taking on more health 
care responsibil i t ies such as gathering information about health, disease, treatments and 
prevention (Kyrouz, Holt, Mittman & Everett, 1 998), another study (Harris, 2(03) 
showed that despite predictions of the increasing importance of consumer choice in 
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shaping the health care delivery system, the image of patients as passive health care 
consumers of physician services holds to be true. Poor health status, higher levels of 
service use in the past year and stronger ties to individual physicians were associated with 
less consumer activism ( Harris, 2(03 ) .  
The interrelationships and influence of health status and co-morbid conditions, 
financial abil i ty to access needed services, changes in provider networks, use of health 
information, behavioral attitudes toward healthcare and health care behaviors on health 
outcomes (as measured by health services uti l ization and health status changes) for 
members with chronic conditions are complex. A multivariate outcomes study to 
determine impacts on health plan members as they transition from managed care 
programs to consumer driven programs is needed to understand discussed components of 
consumer driven health care. Outcomes research for a population with chronic 
conditions is based on the understanding of the dynamic interplay of contextual and 
individual characteristics, health behaviors and outcomes. 
Kane (2004) provides a conceptual model for the outcomes study with the 
interaction of multiple variables that can influence health services uti l ization and health 
status changes. Using the Kane model, coupled with the application of the Andersen 
model of health services use, the outcomes study assessing differences in plan coverage 
between managed care programs and consumer driven health programs can be 
conceptually depicted as Figure 2. The detailed study of how individual and contextual 
characteristics will infl uence the outcomes of uti lization of health care services and/or 
Individual 
Characteristics: 
Need-Evaluated 
Condition acuity 
Co-morbidities 
I ndividual 
Characteristics: 
Predisposing­
Beliefs 
Use of health care 
information 
Use of 
information 
regarding health 
care providers 
Attitudes towards 
health care 
Health care 
behaviors that 
influence health 
status 
Member selection 
bias to choose 
Individual Characteristics: 
Predisposing-Demographic 
Enabling-Financing 
Demographics (age, gender, race, 
employment, education, i ncome) 
Level of consumer cost sharing 
accountabi l i ty 
Employer group offering of types 
of health i nsurance products 
Tiered provider networks 
Access to health services 
Health Behaviors/Outcomes: 
Util ization of health care services 
Health status changes 
Figure 2: Andersen Behavioral Model Adaptation of Health Service Use/Outcomes 
Research Model 
changes in  health status i s  needed to understand how these components of consumer 
driven health care wil l  impact populations with HF, DM and/or CAD. 
A focus on consumer cost sharing accountabil i ty, condition acuity and co-
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morbidities, on util ization of health care services and health status can be studied through 
the comparison of consumer experience in managed care and consumer driven health 
care. Additional components to consider in the study include member demographics, the 
abi l i ty of the member to choose certain plans designated by the employer and member 
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selection bias to choose certain plans. A key component i n  this study wil l  be consumer 
cost sharing accountabil i ty for members with the diagnosed conditions of H F, DM and/or 
CAD and their impacts to health outcomes. 
Comparison of Managed Competition and Consumerism 
A comparison of managed care and consumer driven health care wil l  provide 
detail in developing the study model .  Differences can be described through previous 
research comparing the health care models of managed competition which HMOs are 
based, and consumerism which CDHPs are based. Robinson (2005) provides a detailed 
comparison of managed competition and consumerism for multiple components of the 
health care market: 
1 .  Managed competition considers large physician and hospital organizations as being a 
source of coordination and incentive alignment, with preferred practice settings being 
multi -specialty medical groups in an integrated del ivery system. Consumerism views 
large physician and hospital organizations as often being bureaucratic and 
monopol istic, with preferred practice settings being small physician practices with 
single specialty hospitals. 
2 .  Managed competition considers provider practice variations and quality shortfal ls as 
resulting from weak consumer choices. Consumerism views price-conscious 
consumer choice as generating appropriate provider behavior. 
3 .  Managed competition considers capitation and salary as  the preferred provider 
payment methodology, with measures of physician organizations and a spectrum of 
services as preferred performance measures. Consumerism views fee-for-service and 
episode-of-i l lness pricing as the preferred provider payment method, with measures 
of individual physicians and cl in ical services as preferred performance measures. 
4. Managed competition supports health insurance plans, and considers them as 
supporting consumer choice and provider coord ination, as well as spreading risk. 
Consumerism is skeptical regarding health insurance plans, and considers insurance 
as being necessary to spread consumer risk but also fostering consumer price­
unconscious demand. 
Robi nson (2005) also provides a comparison of managed competition and 
consumerism regarding the key study variables of consumer cost sharing: 
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1 .  Managed competition supports l imited consumer cost sharing economic incentives at 
the time of seeking care with a focus on quality rather than cost. Consumerism 
supports substantial consumer cost sharing incentives at the t ime of seeking care, with 
strong incentives to consider cost as well as quality. 
2. The preferred benefit design for managed competition is l imited consumer cost 
sharing and comprehensive coverage with modest co-payments. The preferred 
benefit design for consumerism is extensive consumer cost sharing and high 
deductibles with health savings accounts. 
A comparison of managed competi tion and consumerism identifies key 
differences regarding consumer cost sharing. While the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment demonstrated that if patients pay more health care bills directly out of pocket 
they will  consume less health care, i t  did not measure effects on health status and use of 
cl inically appropriate or inappropriate services (Davis, 2004). There are concerns 
regarding increased consumer cost sharing having detrimental impacts on access to 
needed care, especially for those with chronic health conditions (Mays, Hurley & 
Grossman, 2(03) .  These concerns are in contrast to potential benefits of consumer cost 
sharing that include increased consumer responsibil i ty resulting in efficient health 
services uti lization (Harris, 2003 ; Hertzlinger, 2(04).  
Key research questions include: 
I. What factors are associated with a change in health insurance coverage from HMOs 
to COHPs for members with the chronic health conditions of HF, CAD and/or OM? 
2 .  If  health services uti l ization is affected, i s  i t  increased or  decreased? 
3 .  I f  health services ut il ization i s  affected, what are factors regarding consumer cost 
sharing and i ncome level that are correlated with health services ut i l ization? 
4. If health status changes occur, are they increased or decreased? 
5 .  If health status changes occur, what are factors regarding consumer cost sharing and 
income level that are correlated with changes in health status? 
Proposed Study Model 
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The study model to answer the identified research quest ions incorporates the 
Andersen behavioral model of health services use that is applied to the outcomes research 
model to provide a framework in identifying interrelationships for consumer driven 
health care. These include individual characteristics of consumer cost sharing 
responsibility and income level, individual characteristics of consumer condition acuity 
and co-morbidities and health behaviors/outcomes of consumer ut i l ization of health 
services and changes in consumer health status. 
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The study model is broken down into more detail by comparing the health care 
models of managed competition and consumerism and the associated impacts of member 
cost sharing. The managed competition model includes l imited consumer cost sharing 
while the consumerism model includes extensive cost sharing. In this analysis, cost 
sharing is compared using the managed competition health insurance products of HMOs 
and the consumerism health i nsurance product of CDHPs. HMOs tend to have first­
dollar coverage without deductibles with modest co-payments and CDHPs tend to have 
high deductibles with h igh co-payments. 
The study model focuses on consumers in HMOs and CDHPs that have been 
diagnosed with the chronic health  care conditions of HF, DM and/or CAD. As opposed 
to consumers who are healthy or have episodic health care conditions, consumers with 
these chronic conditions may be affected by higher deductibles and co-payments as 
experienced in CHDPs as compared to HMOs. H igher consumer cost sharing for 
consumers with chronic health condit ions in CDHPs could result in lower health services 
uti l ization and adverse changes in condition acuity than for consumers with chronic 
health conditions in HMOs. 
Figure 3 depicts a conceptual model of an analysis based on the comparison of 
managed competition and consumerism. Differences between HMOs and CDHPs in 
consumer cost sharing are applied to consumers who have been diagnosed with HF, DM 
and/or CAD. This influences health care outcomes for health services uti l ization and 
changes in health status for these members. It is noted that additional variables of 
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Figure 3:  Conceptual Study Model of Outcomes for Heart Failure, Diabetes and Coronary 
Artery Disease 
member demographics, employer group offerings of health insurance offerings and 
member selection bias wil l  need to be considered throughout the study. 
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Study H ypotheses 
The difference between HMOs and COHPs in member cost sharing for consumers 
with chronic health conditions presents a key study for the transition from the health care 
model of managed competitionIHMOs to consumerism/COHPs. The RAND study 
showed that health care consumers are sensit ive to cost sharing and will consume less 
health care when faced with higher cost sharing (Keeler, 1 992). The l iterature review 
indicates that increases in member cost sharing wi l l  result  in decreases in health services 
ut i l ization, and there are concerns that this wil l  have adverse health effects for consumers 
with chronic health condi t ions and/or consumers with lower financial incomes 
(Robinson, 2002; Enthoven, 2003; Mays, Hurley & Grossman, 2003; American College 
of Physicians, 2004; Oavis, 2004). 
The overall hypothesis for consumers who change to COHPs and have diagnoses 
that are consistent with the conditions of HF, OM and/or CAO is they wil l  have lower 
health services ut i l ization when compared to consumers with these conditions who 
remain in HMOs, in the init ial year after transit ioning from the HMO to the COHP. 
Whi le the RANO experiment showed that the use of physician services was more 
sensit ive than the use of hospital services (Davis, 2004), the detailed hypotheses for the 
study wi l l  consider all of the following measures of uti l ization to be directional : 
I. Primary care physician ut i l ization (PCP visits) for members with diagnoses of heart 
fai lure, diabetes and/or coronary artery disease in a COHP wi l l  be lower than 
members with diagnoses of heart failure, diabetes and/or coronary artery disease who 
remain in an HMO. 
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2 .  Specialty care physician ut i l ization (specialist visits) for members with diagnoses of 
heart failure, diabetes and/or coronary artery disease in a CDHP wil l  be lower than 
members with diagnoses of heart failure, diabetes and/or coronary artery disease who 
remain in an HMO. 
3 .  Inpatient ut i l ization ( inpatient admissions) for members wi th  diagnoses of heart 
failure,  diabetes and/or coronary artery disease in a CDHP wi l l  be lower than 
members with diagnoses of heart failure, diabetes and/or coronary artery disease who 
remain in an HMO. It is noted that decreased ut i l ization of primary care physicians 
and specialists could cause exacerbation of cl in ical conditions and result  in increased 
inpatient uti lization. It is assumed that exacerbation of clinical conditions due to 
decreased uti l ization of physicians will be l imited in the in i t ial year after changing 
health insurance products. 
4. Outpatient uti l ization (outpatient procedures) for members with diagnoses of heart 
failure,  diabetes and/or coronary artery disease in a CDHP will  be lower than 
members with diagnoses of heart fai lure, diabetes and/or coronary artery disease who 
remain in an HMO. 
5 .  Emergency room uti l ization (ER visits) for members with diagnoses of heart failure, 
diabetes and/or coronary artery disease in a CDHP will be lower than members with 
diagnoses of heart failure, diabetes and/or coronary artery disease who remain in an 
HMO. It is noted that decreased uti l ization of PCPs and special ists could cause 
exacerbation of clinical conditions and result  in increased emergency room 
uti l ization. It is assumed that exacerbation of cl inical conditions due to decreased 
uti l ization of physicians wi l l  be l imited in the initial year after changing health 
insurance products. 
Hypotheses for actual and projected changes in  health status are as follows: 
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I. Members with diagnoses of heart failure, diabetes and/or coronary artery disease in  a 
CDHP wil l  have higher actual adverse health status changes than members with 
diagnoses of heart fai lure,  diabetes and/or coronary artery d isease in an HMO. 
2 .  Members with diagnoses of heart fai lure, diabetes and/or coronary artery disease in  a 
CDHP wil l  have higher projected adverse acui ty  status changes than members with 
diagnoses of heart failure,  diabetes and/or coronary artery disease in an HMO. 
The methods chapter will explain the analytic approach to measure and test the 
study model and h ypotheses. The study provides descriptive detail regarding consumer 
experience in HMOs and CDHPs with a focus on the impact of cost sharing on 
consumers with diagnoses that are consistent with the chronic health conditions of HF, 
OM and/or CAD. Understanding the impact on members with chronic diseases and the 
implications for population health status provides valuable information for future 
planning for health care delivery models .  
CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
This research exarrunes d ifferences in product benefits regarding cost sharing 
between health maintenance organizations and consumer driven health plans, member 
demographics, member estimated income levels and member health acuity on the 
outcomes of uti l ization of health services and health status of members that have 
diagnoses that are consistent with chronic health conditions of heart failure ( HF), diabetes 
mell itus (DM) and/or coronary artery disease (CAD). The study methodology includes 
discussion of data sources, study samples, the analytic approach and human subjects 
protection review. 
Data Sources 
The study was completed by analysis of member claims data for a major health 
insurance company that administers health insurance products for four mill ion members. 
The health insurance products included in the study are a Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO), and a Consumer Driven Health Plan (CDHP). The study uti l izes 
health plan claims data on a retrospective basis .  Claims data are developed through 
HCFA- J 500 and/or U8-92 submission (hard-copy or electronically) by providers for 
reimbursement by the health plan. 
The study population is comprised of health plan members in commercial 
products between 1 8-64 years of age who have claims that are consistent with conditions 
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of HF, CAD and/or OM in the HMO and the COHP health insurance products. The 
control group consists of the study population in the HMO wi th diagnoses that are 
consistent with HF, CAD and/or OM. The study group consists of the study population 
in the COHP product with diagnoses that are consistent with HF, CAD and/or OM that 
have transitioned from the HMO. 
Measurement 
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The study wi l l  ut i l ize health plan claims data for the year 2006. Analytical units 
on the claims data wi l l  include member age, gender, diagnoses and procedures. There is  
normal ly a three-month run-out period for claims data to be completed. Therefore, 
analysis for actual ut i l ization and health status changes in 2006 for the control and study 
groups were measured in  second quarter 2007. Projected health status changes (acuity) 
for 2007 were also calculated in  second quarter 2007. 
Study and control group acuitylrisk measurement wi l l  be obtained using 
proprietary software that is uti l ized by the health plan. Member risk scores (health status) 
are based on member episodes of care, prior use related to those episodes of care and 
prescription drugs. The logic for calculation of member risk scores include grouping of 
member claims into episodes of care that measure disease prevalence, co-morbidit ies and 
complications to create homogeneous risk marker categories. Weights measuring the 
contribution of each of these risk marker categories are applied to create member risk 
scores. 
The risk scores reflect an individual measure of risk relative to that of the overall 
population. A score of 1 .0 indicates risk comparable to that of the non-elderly population 
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used i n  developing the model .  A score o f  1 .20 indicates a 20 % greater risk, and a score 
of 0.80 indicates a 20% lower risk. It is noted that a member without any claims or 
episodes of care wil l  receive a retrospective risk score of zero and a prospective risk 
score equal to the weight on their age-gender category. 
Member risk scores can be applied either prospectively or retrospectively .  
Retrospective risk assessment uses risk markers for an individual for a base year to  
produce a measure of risk for that same year. A prospective application uses markers for 
a base year to measure risk for a future year. 
Study Design 
The study is designed to ascertain and compare initial differences in actual health 
services uti l ization and health status, and projected health status, for health plan members 
wi th HF, CAD and/or OM who remain in the HMO and health plan members with HF, 
CAD and/or OM who transition to the CDHP over a one year t ime period of 2006. The 
study wil l  analyze retrospective member claims for 2006 using an untreated or non­
equivalent control group pretest and posttest design (Cook & Campbel l ,  1 979). 
The study wil l  examine benefit differences between the health plan HMO and 
CDHP products. Product benefit differences vary by the type of plans that are purchased, 
with product differences between large and smal l group and/or individual contracts. 
Members may be offered one product at enrol lment, or they may be able to choose from 
two or more products (dual enrollment options). Normal ly, member benefits are 
determined by the type of product(s) that their employer chooses. 
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A review of the member l iabil i ty between the health plan products shows the 
highest potential for differences in member cost sharing is for deductibles and co­
payments. There are no in-network deductibles for the HMO versus a range between $0 -
$500 to $ 1 0,000 for individual coverage, or between $0 - $ 1 ,500 to $30,000 for family 
coverage for the CDHP. The minimal deductibles of $500 for individual and $ 1 ,500 for 
family coverage are the most common. There are no co-payment percentages for the 
HMO versus a range between 0% and 50% for the CDHP, with in-network co-payments 
of 20% individual being the most common. 
The study group will be members who transition from the HMO to the CDHP at 
the beginning of 2006, and the control group will be members who remain in the HMO 
over the one-year t ime period. Multivariate anal ysis will be performed to determine 
whether independent variables of benefit differences between the two products 
(deductibles and co-insurance), member financial income, member demographics and 
member health status affect actual health services util ization and health status, and 
projected health status, for members in both groups. 
The study and control groups are developed from health plan claims data that 
ident ified members with HF, OM and/or CAD who remained in the HMO or transitioned 
into the CDHP in December 2005 or January 2006. The study will focus only on 
members that did not have a selection choice between insurance products to help to 
control for selection bias. Selection bias may ex ist if members choose a product based on 
their perceived and actual acuity (e .g. ,  sicker members choosing a HMO and healthier 
members choosing a CDHP) versus no product choice for the member (e.g. ,  the employer 
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designates only an HMO or CDHP), or other unobserved variables that can lead to a 
selection preference. It i s  noted that the potential for selection bias at the employer 
administrative level, based on demographics and acuity level of the employees, may 
exist .  As there are no members in  the control and study groups with health savings 
accounts, this variable wil l  not be used in the analysis. 
Analytic Approach 
The analytic approach is based on the l i terature review, conceptual model and 
h ypotheses that there wi l l  be differences in HMOs and CDHPs for actual and predicted 
use of health services and changes in health status, and projected health status, due to 
differences in member financial responsibility. Table I indicates an overview of the 
study regarding health plan differences, how members are influenced by i l lness burden, 
the independent variables regarding type of insurance plan and financial income status, 
member demographics, member health status and dependent variables of health services 
ut i l ization and changes in health status. 
T bl I S d 0 a e tu ly vervlew 0 f H al h PI D ' ff e t an 1 erences an d M  easures 
Health Plan Member I llness Independent Variables Dependent 
Differences Burden Variables 
Between HMOs 
and CDHPs 
• I ncreased first • HF, CAD and/or • Type of insurance plan in  • Actual use 
dollar coverage DM -7 2006 -7 of health 
responsibi l ity • Severity of i l l ness -7 • Amount of cost sharing in  services 
(deductible) -7 2006 -7 • Actual 
• Increased co- • Financial i ncome status -7 changes in  
insurance · Member demographics -7 health status 
responsibil ity -7 • Member health status -7 • Projected 
changes in 
health status 
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Identified independent study variables are as fol lows: 
I. The health insurance products for the control and experimental groups. These include 
the HMO, the CDHP with HMO similar health insurance benefits and the CDHP wi th 
CDHP similar benefits. This variable wi l l  be used to ascertain if overall product 
design wil l  affect the dependent variables. 
2 .  Actual member age. 
3. Member gender: I =Male, 2=Female. 
4. Estimated household i ncome levels are based on member demographic information 
and are obtained through proprietary software that is  ut i l ized by the health plan. 
These variables may impact member abi l i ty to uti l ize health care services, and may be 
correlated with member deductibles/co-payments as well as ut i l ization of health 
serviceslhealth status. Variable measures are $0 - $29,999 = I ,  $30,000-$49,999 = 2, 
$50,000-$74,999 = 3, $75,000-$ 1 24,999 = 4, �$ 1 25,000 = 5 .  
5 .  Estimated individual member financial net  worth levels are based on member 
demographic information and are obtained through proprietary software that is 
ut i l ized by the health plan. Variable measures are: <$25,000 = I ,  $25,000-$49,999 = 
2, $50,000-$74,999 = 3, $75,000-$99,999 = 4, $ 1 00,000-$ 1 49,999 = 5, $ 1 50,000-
$249,999 = 6, $250,000-$499,999 = 7, $500,000-$749,999 = 8, �$750K= 9. 
6. In-network per-person deductible levels in the health plan: Ind ividual: $0= 1 ,  $ 1  -
$500=2, $50 1 -$ 1 ,000=3, $ 1 ,00 1 -$ 1 ,500=4, $ 1 ,50 1 -$2,000=5, >$2,000=6. 
7 .  In-network family deductible levels in the health plan ($0= 1 ,  $ 1 -$500=2, $50 1 -
$ 1 ,000=3, $ 1 ,00 1 -$ 1  ,500=4, $ 1 ,50 1 -$2,000=5, $2,00 1 -$2,500=6, $2,50 J -$3,000=7, 
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$3,00 1 -$3 ,500=8, $3,50 1 -$4,000=9, $4,00 1 -$4,500= 1 0, $4,50 1 -$5,000= I I , $5,00 1 -
$5,500= 1 2, $5,00 1 -$6,000= 1 3, $6,00 1 -$6,500= 1 4, $6,50 1 -$7,000= 1 5, >$7,000= 1 6. 
8. The member in-network physician (primary care physician and specialist) co­
insurance in the health plan level :  0% = I, 1 %  - 1 0% = 2, 1 1 % - 20% = 3, 2 1  % - 30% 
= 4, 3 1  % - 40% = 5. Control and study group member co-payments for inpatient and 
outpatient faci l i ties are not included in the study. 
The study will  include the fol lowing dependent variables: 
I. Actual number of member professional (primary and specialty) care visits in 2006. 
This wi l l  be measured by claims data. 
2 .  Actual inpatient, outpatient and emergency room ut i l ization. This wi l l  be measured 
by claims data. It is noted that some ut i l ization measures may vary from the 
hypotheses of the study group having lower ut i l ization than the control group, as 
lower professional care v isits may resul t  in h igher emergency room and/or inpatient 
uti l ization due to exacerbation of cl inical condit ions caused by not receiving primary 
or specialist care. 
3. Actual member retrospective acu i ty score changes in 2006. This wi l l  be measured 
through proprietary software that is ut i l ized by the health plan. 
4. Projected member acu i ty score changes in 2007. This will be measured through 
proprietary software that is ut i l ized by the health plan. 
Table 2 shows the design for independent and dependent variables to be used in 
the study. 
Table 2 Independent and Dependent Variables 
Study Independent Variables Study Dependent Variables 
Health I nsurance Products (Grouping Health Services Utilization: 
Variable) • Actual number of professional (primary 
• Member in HMO and specialty) care visits in  2006. 
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• Member in CDHP with HMO similar • Actual inpatient, outpatient and emergency 
benefits room uti l ization in 2006. 
• Member in CDHP with CDHP similar 
benefits 
Age 
• Individual Member Age 
Gender 
• I = Male, 2 = Female 
Estimated Household Income: 
• $0-$29,999 = I, $30,000-$49,999 = 2, 
$50,000-$74,999 = 3, $75,000-$ 1 24,999 
= 4, �$ 1 25,000 = 5 
Estimated Indj vidual Financial Net- Worth: 
• <$25,000 = I, $25,000-$49,999 = 2 
$50,000-$74,999 = 3, $75,000-$99,999 = 
4, $ 1 00,000-$ 1 49,999 = 5, $ 1 50,000-
$249,999 = 6, $250,000-$499,999 = 7, 
$500,000-$749,999 = 8, �$750,000 = 9 
In-Network Per-Person Deductible 
• $0 = I, $ 1 -$500 = 2, $50 1 -$ 1,000 = 3, 
$ 1,00 1 -$ 1,500 = 4, $ 1,50 1 -$2,000 = 5, 
>$2,000 = 6 
In-Network Family Deductible 
• $0 = I, $ 1 -$500 = 2, $50 1 -$ 1,000 = 3, 
$ 1,00 1 -$ 1,500 = 4, $ 1 ,50 1 -$2,000 = 5, 
$200 1 -$2,500 = 6, $2,50 1 -$3,000 = 7, 
$3,00 1 -$3,500 = 8,  $3,50 1 -$4,000 = 9, 
$4,00 1 -$4,500 = 1 0, $4,50 1 -$5,000 = I I, 
$5,00 1 -$5,500 = 1 2, $5,50 1 -$6,000 = 1 3, 
$6,00 1 -$6,500 = 1 4, $6,50 1 -$7,000 = 1 5, 
>$7,000 = 1 6  
In-Network Physician Co-Insurance Levels 
• 0% = I, 1 %- 1 0% = 2, 1 1 %-20% = 3, 
2 1  %-30% = 4, 3 1  %-40% = 5 
Member 2006 Retroactive Acuity Scores 
• Individual member acuity score 
Health Status Changes: 
• Actual member retrospective acuity score 
changes in 2006. 
• Projected member acuity scores in 2007. 
67 
An analysis of employer group size and differences in member demographics and 
acuity levels between the control and study groups wil l  be made to determi ne if selection 
bias may exist at the employer group decision miling level .  The emphasis of the study 
will be on the control group and the study group with CDHP similar benefits, as this wil l  
provide a comparison of significant differences between HMO and CDHP member cost 
sharing responsibil ities. Statistical power for the study wil l  be performed using SPSS 
SamplePower® software. 
SPSS® software will  be used to perform statistical analyses. Analyses wil l  
include descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables. Testing for 
d ifferences i n  the group means of the independent and dependent variables for the control 
and study groups wi l l  i nclude the use of (-tests and chi-square tests (Polit & Beck, 2004). 
Additionally, probabil i ty analysis of uti l ization will  be performed to ascertain d ifferences 
between the control and study groups. 
S tatistical significance between the independent and dependent variables wil l  be 
determined by Multivariate Analysis of Yariance (MANOY A) .  MANOY A is used to test 
the signi ficance of differences in group means for two or more dependent variables that 
are being considered simultaneously by tiling inter-correlations of dependent variables 
into account (Polit & Beck, 2004). Separate Analysis of Yariance (ANOY A) tests or t­
tests may not control for overall experiment-wide error rate and may ignore correlations 
between dependent variables, while MANOY A may detect combined differences not 
found in  univariate tests (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1 998) .  The comparison of 
products (HMO, CDHP with HMO simi lar benefits, and CDHP with CDHP simi lar 
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benefits) will be the primary analysis and the other independent variables will be 
considered as covariates. A RAND 2-Part Model will be used to compare probabi l i ties of 
health plan member ut i l ization. Mult ivariate Analysis of Co-Variance (MANCOV A) 
will be used to simultaneously test for d ifferences in  the group means for uti l ization and 
health status dependent variables. 
Overall mult ivariate formulas for ut i l ization are : 
l .  Primary Care Physician V isits = j (Grouping Variable, Age, Gender, Estimated 
Household Income, Estimated Individual Financial Net-Worth, In-Network Per­
Person Deductible, In-Network Fami ly  Deductible, In-Network Physician Co­
Insurance Level, Member 2006 Retroact ive Acuity Scores) 
2 .  Specialty Physician Visits =j (Grouping Variable, Age, Gender, Estimated 
Household Income, Estimated Individual Financial Net-Worth, In-Network Per­
Person Deductible, In-Network Family Deductible, In-Network Physician Co­
Insurance Level, Member 2006 Retroactive Acuity Scores) 
3 .  Inpatient Admission = j (Grouping Variable, Age, Gender, Estimated Household 
Income, Estimated Individual Financial Net-Worth, In-Network Per-Person 
Deductible, In-Network Family Deductible, In-Network Physician Co-Insurance 
Level, Member 2006 Retroactive Acuity Scores) 
4 .  Outpatient Procedures = j (Grouping Variable, Age, Gender, Estimated Household 
Income, Estimated Individual Financial Net-Worth, In-Network Per-Person 
Deductible, In-Network Family Deductible, In-Network Physician Co-Insurance 
Level, Member 2006 Retroactive Acuity Scores) 
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5 .  Emergency Room Visi ts  = j CGroupiog Variable, Age, Gender, Estimated Household 
Income, Estimated Individual Financial Net-Worth, In-Network Per-Person 
Deductible, In-Network Fam.ily Deductible, In-Network Physician Co-Insurance 
Level, Member 2006 Retroact ive Acuity Scores) 
Overall multivariate formulas for health status changes are: 
1 .  Actual retrospect ive risk score = j CGrouping Variable, Age, Gender, Estimated 
Household Income, Estimated Individual Financial Net-Worth, In-Network Per­
Person Deductible, In-Network Family Deductible, In-Network Physician Co­
Insurance Level, Member 2006 Retroactive Acuity Scores) 
2 .  Projected prospective risk score = j CGrouping Variable, Age, Gender, Estimated 
Household Income, Estimated Individual Financial Net-Worth, In-Network Per­
Person Deductible, In-Network Fam.ily Deductible, In-Network Physician Co­
Insurance Level, Member 2006 Retroactive Acuity Scores) 
Institu tional Review Board Review/Health Plan Oversight 
Institut ional Review Board C IRB)  human subject review and Exempt Status was 
obtained through the V irginia Commonwealth University review process. The study is a 
retrospective analysis using existing claims data that was previously collected for another 
purpose Ccalculation of provider reimbursement), and will not influence member choice 
in health plans or ut i l ization of health services. The study is also performed under the 
auspices of the health plan Qual ity Improvement Committee as a potential quality 
improvement initiative .  
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The results chapter wil l  fmalize the control and study groups and wil l  provide a 
detailed analysis of member ut i l izat ion and acuity changes. Study results for member 
health services ut i l ization wil l  be obtained uti l izing a logistic and MANOY A statistical 
approach .  Study results for member health status changes wi l l  be obtained by ut i l izing a 
MANOVA statistical approach. A MANCOY A model to ascertain independent variable 
effects and ut i l ization and health status change interactions wi l l  also be developed. 
CHAPTER FIVE:  ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The study is  a detailed analysis of ut i l ization and acuity change differences 
between members in a health plan Health Maintenance Organ ization (HMO) and 
members in a health plan Consumer Driven Health Plan (CDHP) with significant benefit 
differences when compared to the HMO. Control and study groups are finalized and 
independent variables, dependent variables and hypotheses are tested. Statistical analyses 
are developed and performed, and resu lts are documented. 
Finalization of Control and Study Groups 
Employer group sizes from which the control and study groups were derived are 
grouped into mUltiple categories by the health plan. There are 1 0,074 employer groups 
that have a health plan HMO product and there are 1 4,070 employer groups that have a 
health plan CDHP product. The health plan HMO group sizes range from 2 to 56,468 
members with an average group size of 70 members. The health plan CDHP group sizes 
range from 2 to 30,540 members with an average group size of 65 members. 
Member attrition due to death or leaving the health plan throughout 2006 resulted 
in moderate decreases of group sizes. The control group size decreased 1 7  % from 7 , 1 87 
members to 5,922 members. The study group size decreased 20% from 2,036 members 
to 1 ,629 members. 
The health plan Quality Improvement Committee review of clinical diagnoses 
relating to the three targeted clinical conditions revealed diagnoses that were not 
7 1  
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considered to be chronic conditions. These d iagnoses were removed resulting in the final 
d iagnosis l ist that is shown in Appendix I. Removal of these diagnoses resulted in  
l i mited decreases of group size. The control group size decreased I I  % from 5,922 
members to 5,288 members. The study group size decreased 1 3% from 1 ,629 members 
to 1 ,422 members. 
Group descriptions for the study are comprised as follows: 
I. Health plan members with CHF, DM and/or CAD who remained in the health plan 
HMO throughout 2006 are designated as the Control Group (CG).  There are 5,288 
members in the CG. 
2. Health plan members with CHF, DM and/or CAD who transitioned to and remained 
in the health plan CDHP throughout 2006, and had health plan benefits that were 
similar to the HMO (no deductibles and l imited physician coinsurance) ,  are 
designated as Study Group I (SG I). There are 734 members in SG I .  
3 .  Health plan members with CHF, DM and/or CAD who transitioned to and remained 
in the health plan CDHP throughout 2006, and had health plan benefits with higher 
member cost sharing than the HMO (deductibles and higher physician coinsurance) ,  
are designated as Study Group 2 (SG2) .  The focus of the study and interpretation of 
results are for the comparison of CG and SG2, as d ifferences in member cost sharing 
responsibil ities are the research interest between these groups. There are 688 
members in SG2. 
Statistical power calculations for the groups show h igh power. A standard power 
analysis resu lt of at least 0.80 is a normal goal and indicates a 20% chance of committing 
a Type I I  error (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & B lack , 1 998; Polit & Beck, 2(04).  The power 
calculation resu lt for SG I using eight  covariates and seven dependent variables is 0.9 1 .  
The power calculation result for SG2 using up-to eight covariates and seven dependent 
variables is  0.88. 
Independent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
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Comparison of study group independent variables with the control group for 
significant differences are shown in Table 3. The table shows similarities and differences 
across study groups. Predisposing variables of age and gender show d ifferences between 
the control and study groups. Enabling characteristics include financial variables. The 
need variable of 2006 retrospect ive risk score shows differences between the control and 
study groups. 
Product grouping variables of CG, SG I and SG2 are used with all statistical tests. 
This variable compares the control group to each of the two study groups. 
The predisposing demographic age variable is a continuous variable for all 
members. Both SG I and SG2 showed statistical significance indicating members in the 
study groups are younger than in the CG. The predisposing demographic gender variable 
shows a significantly higher female population in the CG as compared to both SG 1 and 
SG2. 
Household income classification shows a symmetrical distribution with variabil i ty 
between groups, as is i l lustrated in  Figure 4. This enabling variable shows a majority of 
member household incomes are between $30,000 and $74,999. 
Estimated individual net worth classification ranges show a non-symmetrical 
d istribution with variability between groups, as i l lustrated in Figure 5. This enabling 
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Table 3 :  Independent Variable Comparison for Significant Differences Between Control 
an d S d G tu Iy roups 
Independent Control Group Study Group One Study Group Two 
Variable (CG) (SG I )  (SG2) 
(Characteristic) 
Product Grouping Control SG I SG2 
N=5,228 N=734 N=688 
Age Mean: 49.74 Mean: 47.47 Mean: 48.00 
( Predisposing) T-Test: -5.66 T-Test : -4.20 
Sig: .. 000 Sig: .000 
Gender Male: 2,390 - 45.7% Male: 374 - 5 1 .0% Male: 330 - 48.0% 
( Predisposing) Female: 2,840 - Female: 360 -49.0% Female: 358 -52.0% 
54.3% Chi-Square Chi-Square 
Asymp� Sig: .605 Asymp. Sig: .286 
Estimated I :  439 - 8.4% I :  82 - 1 1 .2% I :  76 - 1 1 .0% 
Household I ncome: 2 :  1 ,775 - 34.0% 2 : 2 1 6 - 29.4% 2: 233 - 33.9% 
Classi fications 3: 1 ,660 - 3 1 .8% 3 :  252 - 34.3% 3 :  228 - 33. 1 %  
(Enabling) 4 :  1 , 1 9 1 - 22.8% 4:  1 57 - 2 1 .4% 4: 1 3 1  - 1 9 .0% 
5: 1 63 - 3 . 1 %  5 :  27 - 3.7% 5 :  20 - 2.9% 
Chi-Square Chi-Square 
Asymp. Sig: .000 Asymp. Sig: .000 
Estimated I :  62 1 - 1 1 .9% I :  1 02 - 1 3.9% I :  87 - 1 2.6% 
I ndividual Net- 2: 289 - 5 .5% 2 :  40 - 5.4% 2 :  46 - 6.7% 
Worth 3: 303 - 5.8% 3 :  37 - 5.0% 3 :  38 - 5 .5% 
Classi fications 4 :  355 - 6.8% 4:  58 - 7.9% 4:  52 - 7.6% 
(Enabling) 5 :  693 - 1 3.3% 5: 89 - 1 2. 1 %  5 :  1 02 - 1 4.8% 
6: 1 ,099 - 20.0% 6: 1 40 - 1 9. 1 %  6: 1 50 - 2 1 .8% 
7 :  1 ,307 - 25.0% 7 :  1 90 - 25.9% 7:  1 54 - 22.4% 
8:  385 - 7.4% 8: 52 - 7. 1 %  8 :  37 - 5 .4% 
9: 1 76 - 3.4% 9: 26- 3.5% 9: 22 - 3.2% 
Chi-Square Chi-Square 
Asymp. Sig: .000 Asymp. Sig: .000 
I ndividual $0: 5,228 - 1 00% $0: 734 - 1 00% $ 1 -$500: 625 - 90.8% 
Deductible $50 1 -$ 1 ,000: 36 - 5.2% 
Classification $ 1 ,00 1 -$ 1 ,500: 24 - 3.5% 
Ranges $ 1 ,501 -$2,000: 1 - 0.7% 
( Enabl i ng) >$2,000: 2 - 0.3% 
Household $0: 5,228 - 1 00% $0: 734 - 1 00% $50 1 - $ 1 ,000: 1 00 - 1 4 .5% 
Deductible $ 1 ,00 1 -$ 1 ,500: 525 - 76.3% 
Classifications $2,00 1 -$2,500: 34 - 4.9% 
( Enabl ing) $2,50 1 -$3,000: 26 - 3.8% 
>$7,000: 3 - 0.4% 
Physician 0%: 5,228 - 1 00% 0%: 665 - 90.6% 0%: 1 - 0. 1 %  
Coinsurance 1 %- 1 0%: 40 - 5.4% 1 %- 1 0%: 61 - 8.9% 
Classi fication I 1 %-20%: 29 - 4.0% I I  %-20%: 624 - 90.7% 
Ranges 2 1  %-30%: 2 - 0.6% 
( Enabl ing) 
2006 Relrospective Range: 0-42.74 Range: 0-35 .9 Range: 0-38 .2 1 
Risk Score Mean: 2.76 Mean: 2.22 Mean: 2 . 1 1 
(Need) Median: 2.22 Median: 1 .3 1  Median: 1 .29 
Mode: 0 ( 246, 4.7%) Mode: 0 (66, 9.0%) Mode: 0 (8 1 ,  1 1 .8%) 
T-Test: -4.41 T-Test: -5.66 
Sio: .000 Sig: .0 0 
40. 0% 
i 35. 00/0 30 . 00/0 25. 0% 
I 20 . 00/0 1 5 . 0% . 1 0 . 0°/0' 5 . 0 %  
0 . 0% 
E stimated H o usehold Income 
2 3 4 
Cla ssi fi ca t i o n  
5 
Cont rol G roup 
_ St udy G roup- H M O  
Benefits 
o St udy G roup-CDHP 
Benefits 
Classi fication: I: $0-$29,999; 2: $30,000-$49,999; 3: $50,000-$74,999; 4: $75,000-
$ 1 24,999; 5 :  2:$ 1 25,000 
Figure 4: Estimated Household Income Distribution 
Estimated Individual Net-Worth 
; 30. 0
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25 . 00/0 
20. 00/0 
� 1 5. 00/0 -J 1 0 . 00/0 5 . 00/0 0 . 00/0 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Cl a ssi fication 
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• St udy Group-HMO 
Benefits 
o S t udy Group-CDHP 
Benefits 
Classi fication: I :  < $25,000; 2: $25,000 - $49,999; 3: $50,000 - $74,999; 4: $75,000 - $99,999; 5: 
$ 1 00,000 - $ 1 49,999; 6: $ 1 50,000 - $249,999; 7: $250,000 - $499,999; 8 :  $500,000 -
$749,000; 9: 2:$750,000 
Figure 5 :  Estimated Individual Net-Worth Distribution 
variable shows a majori ty of estimated individual net worth are between $ 1 50,000 and 
$499,999. 
The enabl ing individual deductible classification ranges show deductibles being 
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present only in SG2. The majority (98.2%) of SG2 individual deductibles range from $ 1 -
$500, with $500 deductibles being most common in the health plan. 
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The enabling household deductible classification ranges showed deductibles also 
being present only in SG2. The majority of SG2 deductibles (76.3%) ranged from 
$ 1 ,00 1 -$ 1 ,500. 
The enabling variable of physician (PCP and specialist) coinsurance classification 
ranges are only present in the study groups with most coinsurance occurring in SG2. The 
majority (90.7%) of SG2 physician coinsurance is for I I  %-20%, with 20% coinsurance 
bei ng most common in the health plan. It  is noted that members in both the control and 
study groups are accountable for inpatient and outpatient facil i ty co-payments that are not 
included in the study. These faci l i ty co-payments vary by provider network tiers in the 
study groups. 
The need variable is  represented by the 2006 retrospective risk score. It is  a 
continuous variable and is used as a proxy for member health status/acuity .  The risk 
scores were derived through the health plan proprietary software. These scores were 
obtained in the first quarter of 2006, and are based on member uti l izat ion in 2005 when 
all groups (CG, SG I and SG2) were in the HMO plan. Mean risk scores for SG I and 
SG2 show significantly lower than results than mean risk scores for the CG, suggesting 
that better health status in each group relative to the comparison group. 
Correlation Results 
Correlation analysis of the independent variables using a Pearson Correlation 
measurement reveals moderate to high correlation between some of the variables. 
Correlation analyses for independent variables are included in Appendix 2 .  Variables 
showing correlation sign ificance at the 0.0 I level are shown in Table 4. 
The individual deductible and household deductible variables show high 
correlation. The health plan usual ly  adj usts membership for having more than one 
member per contract, therefore the individual deductible was eliminated from the 
multivariate analysis. 
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The household deductible and physician coinsurance variables are h ighly 
correlated. As there is some physician coinsurance in SG I (9.4%) as opposed to no 
household deduct ibles in  both CG and SG I ,  the household deductible variable was also 
el iminated from the multivariate analysis .  
The household income and individual net worth variables show high correlat ion. 
As was previously noted the health plan contracts usually adjust membership for having 
more than one member per contract and the household income was considered to be a 
more descriptive variable for the popUlation, therefore the individual deductible was 
dropped from the multivariate analysis .  The remaining independent variables of product 
grouping, gender, household income, physician coinsurance, age and 2006 retrospect ive 
risk score were used in the study. 
Dependent Variables and Hypotheses Testing 
Based on the study h ypotheses, the fol lowing dependent variables were used to 
evaluate probabil i ty and actual use rates :  
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I .  Primary Care Physician (PCP) Visits .  This was measured through health plan claims 
data as the number of PCP visi ts for individual members in  CG, SG 1 and SG2 in 
2006. 
2. Specialist V isits. This was measured through health plan clai ms data as the number 
of special i st visi ts for i nd ividual members in CG, SG 1 and SG2 in 2006. 
3 .  Inpatient Admissions. This was measured through health plan claims data as  the 
number of inpatient admissions for individual members in CG, SG 1 and SG2 in 2006. 
4. Outpatient Procedures. This was measured through health plan claims data as the 
number of outpatient procedures for individual members in  CG, SG 1 and SG2 i n  
2006. 
5. Emergency Room (ER) V isits. This was measured through health plan claims data as 
the number of ER visits for individual members in CG, SG 1 and SG2 in 2006. 
Hypotheses for member uti l ization between the groups of interest, CG and SG2, 
are directional . Primary care physician ut i l ization (PCP visits), specialty care physician 
uti l ization (specialist visits), inpatient ut i l ization ( inpatient admissions), outpatient 
ut i l ization (outpatient procedures) and emergency room uti l ization (ER visits) for 
members with diagnoses of heart fai lure, d iabetes and/or coronary artery disease in the 
health plan CDHP (SG2) wil l  be lower than members with diagnoses of heart failure, 
diabetes and/or coronary artery disease in the health plan HMO (CG) .  
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Table 5 shows a correlation analysis of the dependent variables using a Pearson 
Correlation measurement reveals moderate correlation between all variables. All  
variables are significant at the 0.0 1 level with Pearson Correlation scores ranging from 
.097 to .27 1 .  H igher correlations were seen between PCP visits and specialist visits 
( .27 1 ), special ist visits and outpatient procedures ( .250) and ER visits and special i st visits 
( . 204). 
Table 5 :  Correlation A is for Variables 
Pearsofi Correlation Coefficient 
• Special ist Visits .27 1 * *  • .000 
• Inpatient Admissions . 1 46** • .000 
• Outpatient Procedures . 1 33**  • .000 
• ER Visits . 1 55**  • .000 
Specialist V isits • PCP Visits .27 1 * *  • .000 
• Inpatient Admissions .230* * • .000 
• Outpatient Procedures .250** • .000 
• ER Visits .204** • . 000 
Inpatient Admissions • PCP Visits . 1 46** • .000 
• Specialist Visits .230* * • .000 
• Outpatient Procedures . 1 64** • .000 
• ER Visits . 1 54** • .000 
Outpatient • PCP Visits . 1 33**  • .000 
Procedures • Specialist V isits .250** • .000 
• lnpatient Admissions . 1 64* * • .000 
• ER Visits .097** • .000 
ER Visits • PCP Visits . 1 55** • .000 
• Specialist V isits .204** • .000 
• Inpatient Admissions . 1 54* * • .000 
• Procedures .097* *  • .000 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.0 I level (2-tailed) 
Uti l ization Analysis Results 
Table 6 shows a comparison for years 2005 and 2006 mean util ization for all 
members in  the study who were enrolled in the health plan throughout 2005. Members in 
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SG I and SG2 were enrolled in the health plan HMO in 2005 and the CDHP in 2006. The 
CG shows significant decreases in PCP visits, inpatient admissions and outpatient 
procedures in 2006 when compared to 2005. Both SG I and SG2 show significant 
increases in special ist visits in 2006 when compared to 2005. This pattern may have been 
influenced by the CDHP design of members not having to obtain primary care physician 
authorization to util ize special ists which remained in place in the HMO. There is no 
8 1  
evidence of member substitution of specialist visits for PCP visits .  SG2 shows a 
significant decrease in inpatient admissions in 2006 when compared to 2005. 
Table 7 shows the 2005 mean uti l ization comparison between SG I and SG2 to 
CG. Members in SG I and SG2 were enrolled in the health plan HMO in 2005. SG2 
shows significant ly less PCP Visits, Specialist Visits, Outpatient Procedures, and ER 
Visits in 2005 when compared to the CG. 
T bl 7 2005 S d G a e tu Iy roup A verage U T  t l  lzatlOn C ompanson 
Independent Control Group Study Group One Study Group Two 
Variables (CG, N=4,997) (SG 1 , N=644) (SG2, N=600) 
Mean PCP 6. 1 2  5.55 4.76 
Visits T-Test: -.2.82 / Sig: T-Tes! : -7.09 / Sig: 
.005 .000 
Mean 6.54 5.87 4.6 1 / $282 
Specialist T-Tes! : -.2. 14 / Sig: T -Test :  -8. 10 / Sig: 
Visits .033 .000 
Mean 0.60 0.60 0.54 
Inpatient T -Test: -.04 1 / Sig: T-Test: -.783 / Sig: 
Admissions .997 .434 
Mean 2.69 2.65 1 .68 
Outpatient T-Test : -.095 / Sig: T-Tes! :  -6.36 / Sig: 
Procedures .924 .000 
Mean ER 0.64 0.70 0.53 
Visits T-Test: 1 . 1 1 / Sig: T -Test: -2. 1 6 / Sig: 
.267 .031 
Table 8 shows the 2006 mean uti l ization comparison between SG I and SG2 to the 
CG. Health plan allowed payment amounts to providers that are included in the table 
were adjusted to provide comparison between all groups across all services. SG2 shows 
significantly less uti l ization in all measures (PCP Visits, Specialist Visits, Inpatient 
Admissions, Outpatient Procedures and ER Visits) in 2006 when compared to the CG. 
Al lowed payment amounts in SG2 were significantly lower than allowed payment 
amounts in the CG for PCP visits, inpatient admissions and ER visits in 2006. 
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T bl 8 2006 U T a e tl IzatlOn and Payment C ontrol Group Comparison to Study Groups 
Independent Control Group Study Group One Study Group Two 
Variables (CG) (SG 1 )  (SG2) 
Mean PCP 5 .66 / $267 5.53 / $286 4.45 / $2 1 4 
Visits and T-Test: -.729 Sig: T-Test: -7.31 Sig: .000 
Mean Allowed .466 / / 
Amount per T - Test: 2.00 S ig: T- Test: -7.09 Sig: 
Member .046 .000 
Mean 6.49 / $305 6.27 / $360 5.52 / $282 
Specialist T -Test: - .00 1 Sig: T-Test: -3.74 Sig: .000 
Visits and .999 / / 
Mean Allowed T- Test: 3.64 Sig: T- Test: - 1 .69 Sig: 
Amount per 
.000 .09 1 
Member 
Mean 0.47 / $2,599 0.57 / $ 1 ,872 0.26 / $ 1 ,205 
I npatient T-Test : -.005 Sig: T-Test: -5.62 Sig: 
Admissions .996 / .000 / 
and Mean T- Test: -2.09 S ig: T- Test: -5. 13  S ig: 
Allowed .037 .000 
Amount per 
Member 
Mean 2.39 / $ 1 ,055 2.22 / $ 1 ,384 1 .7 1 / $993 
Outpatient T-Test: -.528 Sig: T -Test: -2.90 Sig: 
Procedures .598 / .004 / 
and Mean T - Test: 1 .58 Sig: T- Test: - .232 Sig: 
Allowed . 1 55 . 8 1 6  
Amount per 
Member 
Mean ER 0.6 1 / $377 0.6 1 / $336 0.5 1 / $28 1 
Visits and T-Test: .033 Sig: T-Test: -2.04 Sig: .042 
Mean Allowed .973 / / 
Amount Per T - Test: - 1 .07 Sig: T- Test: -2.73 Sig: 
Member .285 .006 
Probabil ity of Use 
To ascertain Product Grouping differences for members who had util ization in 
2006, probability analysis was performed through a RAND Two-Part Test. individual 
member probabil ities for each uti l ization variable were created.  Probabil ity scores for 
members that had util ization in 2006 were then placed into an Analysis of Covariance 
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(ANCOV A) with Product Grouping used as  a fixed variable and all other independent 
variables used as covariates to obtain predicted probability differences for at least one 
unit  of ut i l ization in 2007. 
Table 9 shows differences between groups in percentages of members that had at 
least one unit  of util ization for the dependent variables in 2006. SG2 shows lower 
percentages of at least one unit  of uti l ization for al l dependent variable measures. 
T bl 9 P b bT A I ·  P a e ro a I i ty nalysls - ercentage 0 
Dependent Variable Control Group 
Unit of Utilization (CG) 
pcp V isit 9 1 .0% 
Special ist Visit 82.5% 
Inpatient Admission 1 6.8% 
Outpatient Procedure 49.9% 
ER V isit 29.0% 
f M  b H em ers avmg 
Study Group I 
(SG I )  
92.5% 
87.6% 
1 8.7% 
48.0% 
30.2% 
U T  tl IzatlOn 
Study Group 2 
(SG2) 
90.0% 
80. 1 %  
1 2.2% 
44.9% 
26.2% 
Table 10 shows pairwise comparison results of differences between the product 
groupings. SG2 shows significant ly less uti l ization for outpatient procedure than CG and 
SG 1 .  It is noted that SG2 shows less uti l ization for PCP Visit than CG and SG I at were 
near significance with p-values of .078 and .053 .  
T b l  1 0  P b bT A al a e ro a I i ty n lyslS - p .  rurwlse C omparlson 
Dependent Variable Comparison Mean Difference Significance 
and G rouping Grouping Variables P-Value 
Variable 
PCP Visi t  I S2 CG -6.727E-02 .078 
SG I -7. I 64E-02 .053 
Special ist Visit I S2 CG 3 . 1 1 6E-02 .549 
SG I 2 .362E-02 .639 
lnpatient Admission I CG -3.342E-02 .5 1 2  
S2 SG I -6.57 1 E-02 . 1 83 
Outpatient Procedure I CG -. 1 86 .007 
S2 SG I -. 1 7 1  .0 1 0  
ER Visit  I S2 CG 2.376E-02 .708 
SG I 7 .07 1 E-03 .908 
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Multivariate Analysis 
S tatistical significance between the independent and dependent variables were 
determined through MANOY A to test for differences in the group means for all 
dependent variables simultaneously. MANOY A is used to test the significance of 
differences in  group means for two or more dependent variables that are being considered 
simultaneously by taking inter-correlations of dependent variables into account (Polit & 
Beck, 2004). Separate Analysis of Co-Yariance (ANCOY A) tests or t-tests may not 
control for overall experiment-wide error rate and may ignore correlations between 
dependent variables, thus increasing the Type I error rate of rejecting the nul l  hypothesis 
when it is  actually true (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1 998).  
MANOY A studies with Product Grouping used as a fixed variable and all other 
independent variables used as covariates are performed. MANOY A Mult ivariate Test 
results for all members (those that had util ization and those that did not have uti l ization) 
are shown in  Table I I. Pillai ' s  Trace and Wi lks' Lambda results indicate independent 
variable significance on the uti l ization dependent variables for gender, 2006 retrospect ive 
risk score and product grouping. It is noted that coinsurance is at near significance with a 
p-value of .057 .  
Table 1 2  shows MANOY A results for independent variable effects on the 
util ization dependent variables. It is noted that R-Square calculations for the model are 
low, ranging from .004 to .062 for the models tested. 
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Table 1 1 · 2006 Util ization MANOY A Multivariate Tests 
Independent Effect Value F -Statistic Significance Observed 
Variable and P-Value Power 
Effect Alpha =.05 
Gender 
(Predisposing) .002 2.93 .0 1 5  . 843 
PiI Iai ' s  Trace .998 2.83 .0 1 5  .843 
Wilks' Lambda 
Physician 
Coinsurance .002 2. 1 5  .057 .7 1 4  
(Enabling) .998 2 . 1 5  .057 .7 1 4  
PiI Iai ' s  Trace 
Wilks' Lambda 
Age 
(predisposing) .00 1 1 .79 . 1 1 0 .62 1 
Pi l lai ' s  Trace .999 1 .79 . 1 I 0 .62 1 
Wilks' Lambda 
2006 
Retrospective 
Risk Score 
(Need) .087 1 25.76 .000 1 .00 
PiI Iai ' s  Trace .9 1 3  1 25.76 .000 1 .00 
Wilks' Lambda 
Estimated 
Household 
Income 
(Enabling) .00 1 .837 .523 .305 
PiI Iai 's Trace .999 .837 .523 .305 
Wilks' Lambda 
Product 
Grouping 
Pil lai ' s  Trace .003 1 .87 .044 .865 
Wilks' Lambda .002 1 .87 .044 .865 
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Table 1 2 ·  2006 Util ization MANOVA Results 
Independent Variable F -Statistic Significance Observed Power 
and Dependent Variable P-Value Alpha =.05 
PRODUCT GROUPING 
pcp Visit  1 .26 . 2 8 1  .277 
Specialist V isit 0.3 1 .734 . 1 00 
I npatient Admission 3. 1 7  .042 .609 
OP Procedure 4.9 1 .007 .808 
ER V isit  0. 1 1  .888 .068 
G ENDER 
(predisposing) 3.68 .055 .483 
PCP Visit 0. 1 6  .684 .069 
Special ist Visit 4.83 .028 .564 
I npatient Admission 0.32 .567 .088 
OP Procedure 3.82 .05 1 .498 
ER V isit 
A G E  
(Predisposing) 2.59 . 1 07 .363 
PCP Visit 0.55 .458 . 1 1 5  
Special ist Visit 0.01 .894 .052 
I npatient Admission 0.0 1 .903 .052 
OP Procedure 4.47 .034 .562 
ER Visit  
ESTIMATED HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME 
(Enabling) 
PCP Visit 0. 1 5  .694 .068 
Special i st Visit 0. 1 8  .664 .072 
I npatient Admission 0.43 .5 1 1  . 1 0 1  
O P  Procedure 0.0 1 .974 .050 
ER Visit 3 .97 .046 .5 1 4  
PHYSICIAN COINSURANCE 
(Enabling) 0.02 .964 .050 
PCP Visit 0.09 .753 .06 1 
Special ist Visit 0.56 .452 . 1 1 7  
I npatient Admission 8 . 1 9  .004 .8 1 7  
O P  Procedure 0.59 .440 . 1 2 1  
E R  Visit  
2006 RETROSPECTrvE 
RISK SCORE 
(Need) 
PCP Visit 1 27.47 .000 1 .00 
Specialist Visit 430.89 .000 1 .00 
I npatient Admission 2 1 5.33 .000 1 .00 
OP Procedure 1 58.69 .000 1 .00 
ER Visit 20. 1 4  .000 .994 
R-Square Calculation 
PCP Visit = .026 
Special ist Visit = .062 
Inpatient Admission = .033 
OP Procedure = .024 
ER Visit = .004 
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Table 1 3  shows MANOV A significant resu lts. Product grouping is significant for 
inpatient admission and outpatient procedure, which i s  where differences between the 
control and study groups occur after controlling for all other variables in the model .  
Estimated household income is significant for ER Visi t .  Physician coinsurance is  
significant for outpatient procedure. Age is significant for ER Visit. Gender is 
significant for PCP Visit, inpatient admission and ER Visit. 2006 Retrospective Risk 
Score is significant for all dependent variables. 
T bl 1 3 2006 MANOVA S · · fi R a e Igm Icant esu ts 
Significant Independent Dependent Variable p-Value at Alpha .05 
Variable 
Grouping Variable • [npatient Admission • .040 
• Outpatient Procedure • .007 
Estimated Household Income • ER Visit • .046 
(Enabl ing) 
Physician Coinsurance • Outpatient Procedure • .004 
(Enabling) 
Age • ER Visit • .034 
( PredisDosing) 
Gender • PCP V isit • .055 
(Predisposing) • Inpatient Admission • .028 
• ER Visit • .05 1 
2006 Retrospective Risk Score • PCP Visit • .000 
(Need) • Specialist Visit • .000 
• Inpatient Admission • 
.000 
• Outpatient Procedure • .000 
• ER Visit • . 000 
Table 1 4  shows posthoc test results for parameter estimates for significant effects 
in the MANOV A using un-standardized regression coefficient scores. Estimated 
household income is positively correlated with ER util ization meaning members with 
higher income are l ikely to have more visits. Higher physician coinsurance levels show 
positive correlation with higher outpatient uti l ization. Age is negatively correlated with 
ER util ization meaning uti l ization is higher among younger members. Males had higher 
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Table 1 4· 2006 MANOY A Posthoc Parameter Estimates 
Significant Independent Dependent Variable Regression Coefficient 
Variable 
Est imated Household Income • ER Visit • 3 .472E-02 
(Enabl ing) 
Physician Coinsurance • Outpatient Procedure • 1 .509 
(Enabl ing) 
Age • ER Visit • -3.52E-03 
( Predisposing) 
Gender • PCP Visit • -.255 
(Predisposing) • Inpatient Admission • -9.20E-02 
• ER Visit • 6.793E-02 
2006 Retrospect ive Risk Score • PCP Visit • . 1 88 
(Need) • Specialist Visit  • .525 
• Inpatient Admission • 8.752E-02 
• Outpatient Procedures • .333 
• ER Visit • 2.222E-02 
PCP and inpatient uti l ization than females, and females had hi-gher ER util ization than 
males. 2006 retrospective risk score is  positively correlated with util ization for all 
dependent variables indicating that members with poorer health status used more services 
in each case. 
Table 1 5  shows posthoc test results for pairwise comparison to ascertain product 
grouping differences for inpatient admissions and outpatient procedures, which were 
significant in the MANOY A. Results show that SG2 has significantly lower util ization 
for outpatient procedures than CG and SG I .  
f fi Table 1 5 :  2006 MANOYA Pairwise Comparison or Signi Icant Product G roupings 
Dependent Grouping Comparison Mean Significance 
Variable Variable Grouping Difference P-Value 
Variables 
Inpatient SG2 CG 3 .479E-02 .884 
Admission SG I - . 1 36 .554 
Outpatient SG2 CG -3 .266 .002 
Procedure SG I -3. 1 57 .002 
Subsequent MANOY A analyses taking into account differences in member 
util ization did not provide additional information. MANOY A results for members that 
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had at least one unit of util ization for all dependent variables were l imited due to the low 
number of members in the study groups (C=292; S 1 =36; S2=20). MANOY A results for 
members that had at least one unit of ut i l ization for at least one dependent variable 
showed similar results and R-Square calculations as the MANOY A for all members. 
Results of Hypothesis Testing 
The one service area in which notable findings were identified related to 
outpatient procedures. Uti l ization analysis results show that, with an exception for 
outpatient procedures, there are no significant differences between SG2 and the CG and 
that the overall stated hypotheses that SG2 wil l  have lower uti l ization than the CG should 
be rejected. While there is lower overall uti l ization for SG2 in 2006, this was also seen in 
2005 when both groups were in  the HMO. Logistic analysis resu lts for members that had 
uti l ization in 2006 and M ANOY A results for all members in the study show no 
significant differences between the groups. 
Overall uti lizat ion analysis results for outpatient procedures show that there are 
significant differences between SG2 and CG and that the stated hypothesis that SG2 wil l  
have lower outpatient ut i l ization than the CG should be accepted. Logistic analysis 
results for members that had uti lization in 2006 and MANOY A results for all members in 
the study show significantly less uti lization for SG2 when compared to the CG. 
The independent variable showing the most significance in the util ization analysis 
is the 2006 Retrospective Risk Score, which is  not surprising since it represented need in 
conceptual model and health status in the empirical model .  MANOY A results show this 
variable to be highly significant for all dependent variables with a positive correlation 
with uti l ization. 
90 
Medical Cost Analysis Resu lts 
Table 1 6  shows pairwise comparison results of average total allowed amount 
differences between groups with and without the independent variables. The comparison 
without the independent variables shows S2 to have significant ly lower total meclical 
costs than the CG. However, when the independent variables are included the results are 
not significant and the mean difference between SG I and CG shows the opposite effect. 
I t  is noted that the only significant independent variable in the analysis was the 2006 
retrospective risk score. Absent this risk adjustment, SG I shows lower overall medical 
costs than the CG. 
T bl 1 6  P 
. 
a e aJrwlse C omparlson 0 f A  verage T I All  ota owe d A  mounts 
Allowed Amount Comparison Mean Difference Significance 
and Grouping Grouping P-Value 
Variable Variables 
Allowed Amount CG - 1 628.3 1 0  .030 
Without SG I - 1 262.0 1 9  . 1 97 
Independent 
Variables / S2 
Al lowed Amount CG 976.3 1 2  .70 1  
With Independent SG I 6 1 4.56 1 .803 
Variables / S2 
Subsequent analysis of the 2006 retrospective risk scores is shown in Appendix 3 .  
Grouping differences for members with 2006 retrospective risk scores o f  � I .O ( lower 
acuity) and �2.0 (higher acuity) were measured to determine effects of acuity on member 
uti l ization and cost . SG2 showed significantly lower uti l ization of outpatient services 
than the CG for members with risk scores � I .O. There were no significant group 
differences in uti lization for members with risk scores �2.0. There were no significant 
group differences in average allowed amounts for members with risk scores � 1 .0 and 
�2.0. 
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Acui ty Analysis Results 
The acuity analysis ut i l izes risk scores developed by the health plan through 
proprietary software. These risk scores were to be used as a proxy for health status of 
individual members in  CG, SG I and SG2. The 2006 retrospective risk scores were 
obtained in first quarter of 2006 and used as an independent variable in analysis of 
uti l ization. These scores were measured against 2007 retrospective risk scores, which 
were obtained in first quarter of 2007, to obtain an understanding of changes in  indi vidual 
member acui ty in 2006. These changes in acu ity were to be measured as a dependent 
variable for health status in a MANOV A model and with util ization results in a 
MANCOV A model.  2007 prospective risk scores were intended to be used to measure 
projected risk for the fol lowing year. 
Risk score measures are shown in Table 1 7 . Comparisons indicate a significant 
decline in 2007 retrospective risk scores and 2007 prospective risk scores for SG I and 
SG2. While the mean 2006-2007 retrospective risk score difference for CG increased 
almost 5%, the mean d ifferences for SG I and SG2 decreased 9 1  %. 
At face value, the initial results indicate that members in SG I and SG2 showed 
significant lower in acuity in 2006. However, further investigation revealed that 93% of 
members in SG I and 87% of members in SG2 had risk scores of zero. Only 7 .3% of 
members in  CG had risk scores of zero. Potential reasons for members having risk scores 
of zero, and thus causing the significant decrease in mean risk scores for SG I and SG2, 
include that incomplete episodes of care are not counted in the development of risk 
scores. The high number of members having risk scores of zeros in SG I and SG2 may be 
due to incomplete episodes of care for members in these products. 
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Table 1 7  2006 2007 Ri  k S - s core M easure C ompansons 
Independent Control Group Study Group One Study Group Two 
Variables (CG) SGI SG2 
Retrospective Range: 0-42.74 Range: 0-35 .9 Range: 0-38.2 1 
Risk Scores Mean: 2.76 Mean: 2.22 Mean : 2. 1 1  
2006: Median : 2.22 Median: 1 . 3 1  Median : 1 .29 
Mode: 0 (246, 4.7%) Mode: 0 (66, 9.0%) Mode: 0 (8 1 , 1 1 .8%) 
T-Test: -4.4 1 T-Test: -5 .66 
S ig: .000 Sig: .000 
Prospective Range: 0.05-30.85 Range: 0. 1 08-24.97 Range: 0. 1 02-24.08 
Risk Scores Mean: 2.76 Mean : 2 . 1 6  Mean : 2 .06 
2006: Median : 2.22 Median: 1 .69 Median :  1 .60 
Mode: 0.36 Mode: 0.36 Mode: 0.48 
Retrospective Range: 0-52.50 Range: 0- 1 8. 14 Range: 0- 1 2. 1 8  
Risk Scores Mean: 2 .89 Mean: 0.20 Mean: 0. 1 9  
2007: Median: 1 .82 Median: 0 Median: 0 
Mode: 0 (324, 6.2%) Mode: 0 (777, Mode: 0 (598, 86.9%) 
9 1 .2%) 
Prospective Range: 0.05-24.53 Range: 0. 1 08- 1 0. 1 3  Range: 0. 1 1 - 1 0.20 
Risk Scores Mean: 2 .70 Mean: 0.53 Mean : 0.56 
2007: Median : 2 . 1 7  Median: 0.36 Median: 0.36 
Mode: 0.36 Mode: 0.69 Mode: 0.69 
Retrospective Mean: +0. 1 3  Mean: -2.03 Mean: - 1 .92 
Risk Score Median: +0.40 Median : - 1 .3 1  Median : - 1 .29 
Difference Mode: Same Mode: Same Mode: Same 
2006-2007 
Due to the questionable change in risk score results obtained for SG I and SG2 the 
study did not include the analysis of acuity differences between CG, SG I and SG2. The 
inabil ity to accurately capture acuity scores in 2007 for members in the health plan 
CDHP render comparison to members in the health plan HMO impossible to complete. 
Important points to consider in the use of acuity measurement based on claims 
data include that the level of util ization impacts acuity measurement. The health plan 
calculation of member risk scores is based on member health services util ization on a 
roll ing twelve-month basis .  This could be problematic when introducing financial 
mechanisms during this t ime period that can decrease uti lization, as acuity scores can be 
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artificially reduced and not be representative of true member health status. S impler and 
more straightforward calculation of acuity may be adopted rather than complex 
algorithms based on uti l ization. 
Conclusion 
Util ization analysis shows that members in  the health plan CDHP with benefit 
differences as compared to the HMO had significantly less uti l ization of outpatient 
procedures than members in the HMO in terms of probabil ity of procedures and volume 
of procedures. No significant differences were seen for PCP, specialist, inpatient and ER 
uti l ization. 
The inabil i ty to use member 2007 risk scores for the study groups in determining 
changes in  acuity negates the abil i ty to compare member health status changes between 
the control and study groups in 2006. Development of the intended MANCOVA model 
of including both health services util ization and health status changes as dependent 
variables was not able to be accompl ished. 
Study results for health services util ization and health status are incorporated into 
the Health Services Use/Outcomes Research Model in the discussion chapter. The 
discussion chapter wil l  also address study l imitations and consideration for future studies. 
CHAPTER S IX :  DISCUSSION 
The health care industry shift from managed care to consumer driven products 
brings about both potential posit ives and negatives for health care consumers. The 
potential for increased access to health information can contribute to more 
knowledgeable consumers regarding health care alternatives, which can lead to healthier 
l ifestyles. However, increased consumer cost-sharing cou ld create incentives for 
consumers to decrease health services uti l ization when they actually need care. 
The contrasting viewpoints between managed competition and consumerism are 
strongest in preferred health plan benefit designs of l imited versus high consumer cost 
sharing. There are overall questions regarding the impacts of increased cost sharing, 
especial ly for populations with chronic health conditions and/or lower financial income 
status. 
Study Results Based on Andersen Model 
This study of initial impacts to health services utilization and health status for 
members with chronic health conditions of congestive heart fai lure, diabetes mell itus 
and/or coronary artery disease in health maintenance organizations ( HMOs) and 
consumer driven health plans (CDHPs) is based on the Andersen Behavioral Model of 
Health Services. Study results for outcomes are based on the contextual characteristics of 
the model 
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Study results for the Need contextual characteristic show that members in the 
CDHP had lower 2006 risk scores, which were the proxy for acuitylhealth status, than 
members in the HMO. This is consistent with the l i terature review that indicates 
favorable selection for ini tial enrol lment of consumers into CDHPs (Harris ,  2003; Davis, 
2004; Parente, Feldman & Chris, 2004; Buntin, Darnberg, Haviland, Kapur, Lurie, 
McDevitt & M arquis,  2(06).  It remains to be seen i f  lower acuity is maintained with 
longer enrol lment in a plan, or i f  there is an init ial selection bias that might d iminish due 
either to disenrollment or more exposure to these products over time. Study results 
showed that health acuity status had a significant impact on health services ut i l ization. 
This is evidenced by the members in the study group having lower acuity scores and less 
overall ut i l ization in 2005 when both control and study groups were in the HMO, and in  
2006 when the members in  the study group switched to the CDHP. This  may have been a 
factor in selection between an HMO or CDHP by the employer groups. The only 
variable to compare the groups was on size and there did not appear to be substantial 
differences for this measure. 
Study results for the Predisposing variables that constituted demographic 
contextual characteristics show that members in the CDHP were significantly younger 
than members in the HMO. Age was negatively correlated with ER utilization, and 
gender impacted uti lization in that males had higher PCP and inpatient uti l ization than 
females and females had higher ER util ization than males. 
Study results for Enabling variables show levels of physician coinsurance 
influencing outpatient util ization, in that higher physician coinsurance levels showed 
positive correlation with higher outpatient util ization. This  is in contrast to results of the 
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RAND study, in that members with h igher cost sharing exhjbited higher ut i l ization for 
this  measurement. Potential causes for this  result i nclude the influence of member 
faci l ity co-payments, which was not included in the study. It is noted that physician 
coinsurance was not present in the HMO and results of physician coinsurance effects on 
uti lization only pertained to members in the CDHP. When control l ing for other factors, 
outpatient uti l ization was lower for the CDHP than the HMO. Estimated household 
income was not signi ficant for health services uti l ization in the study. 
Study results for Behavior variables show that health plan members in the higher 
cost sharing COHP plans had significantly lower outpatient uti l ization than health plan 
members that remained in the HMO. There were no significant differences in  PCP, 
specialist, inpatient and ER ut i l ization between health plan members in  the higher cost 
sharing COPH plans and health plan members that remained in the HMO. 
Study results for Outcomes variables were not able to be obtained due to the 
inabi l ity to use 2007 risk scores for the study group, and a change in  health status could 
not be calculated. 2006 risk scores that were calcu lated using experience from when all 
members were in the HMO were shown to have a h igh influence on all measured 
components of ut i l izat ion. 
Study Results Based on Hypotheses 
Table 1 8  shows study results and hypothesis statements for the uti l ization 
measures. Overall study results compel one to reject the first hypothesis that members in 
with chronic health conditions of congestive heart failure, diabetes mel l itus and/or 
coronary artery disease in COHPs will have lower health services util ization than 
members with the chronic health conditions of congestive heart failure, diabetes mellitus 
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T bl 1 8  S d R f a e tu ly esults or Uti lization 
Utilization 2005 - 2006 Logistic M ANOVA Hypothesis 
Measure Utilization Analysis Results Results Statement 
Comparison 
PCP Visits Lower study No significant No significant Reject 
group uti l ization differences differences hypothesis that 
than control between the between the the study group 
group in both control and study control and study wi l l  have lower 
2005 and 2006 group group uti l ization than 
the control group 
Specialist Visits Lower study No significant No significant Reject 
group ut i l ization differences differences hypothesis that 
than control between the between the the study group 
group in both control and study control and study wi l l  have lower 
2005 and 2006 group group uti l ization than 
the control group 
Inpatient No significant No significant No significant Reject 
Admissions differences differences differences hypothesis that 
between the between the between the the study group 
control and study control and study controi and study wi l l  have lower 
group group group uti l ization than 
the control group 
Outpatient Lower study Study group Study group Accept 
Procedures group ut i l ization shows shows hypothesis that 
than control significant significant the study group 
group in both lower utilization lower utilization will have lower 
2005 and 2006 than the control than the control utilization than 
group group the control 
group 
ER Visits No significant No sign ificant No significant Reject 
differences differences differences hypothesis that 
between the between the between the the study group 
control and study control and study control and study wi l l  have lower 
group group group ut i l ization than 
the control group 
and/or coronary artery disease in the HMO. This is with the exception of util ization of 
outpatient procedures as members in the CDHP showed significantly less util ization, both 
in terms of probability of use and rate of use, than members in the HMO during the study 
t ime period. 
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It is noted that the study group exhibited lower util ization than the control group 
in both 2005 and 2006 for PCP visits, specialist visits, outpatient procedures and ER 
visits. However, these uti l ization differences were not evident when control l ing for the 
independent variable factors and the h ypotheses are stil l rejected. 
The independent variable showing the most significance in the uti l ization analysis 
is  the 2006 retrospective risk score that was used as a proxy for member acu ity or health 
status. MANOY A results showed this variable to be highly significant for al l dependent 
variables with a positive correlation with health services util ization and an influence on 
total medical costs.  
It is noted that MANOY A resu lts from the study showed very low R-Square 
values, which indicates the models accounted for low amounts of variation and that there 
are other influencers of uti l ization that were not included in the models. Additional 
characteristics of the Andersen Behavioral Model of Health Services could have been 
included had these data been available. These characteristics cou ld include 
environmental considerations, demographic differences in util ization, differing provider 
networks between the HMO and CDHP, the gatekeeper effect of primary care physicians  
in the HMO and/or the abi l i tyJin-abi lity of members to  util ize health care information. 
Study results for the health status hypotheses that members with the chronic 
health conditions of congestive heart fai lure, diabetes mellitus and/or coronary artery 
disease in CDHPs will have higher actual and projected acuity status changes than 
members with the chronic health conditions of congestive heart fai lure, diabetes mel litus 
and/or coronary artery disease in the HMO could not be measured. This was due the 
inabi l i ty to use the 2007 risk scores for the study groups. The health plan only util ized 
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complete episodes of care in deriving member risk scores. Future analyses using both 
incomplete and complete episodes of care may be helpful in deriving more accurate risk 
scores. 
I t  is  noted that while selection bias was somewhat controlled for in the study by 
including only members that did not have a choice between the HMO or COHP plans 
they were offered, selection bias could exist at the employer group administrator level 
that determined the type of insurance products that members had access to. While 
employer group sizes for the control and study groups were similar, the study groups 
were sign ificantly younger and had significantly lower acuity scores than the control 
group. No information on industry sector or wage levels of workers was available. This 
may have impacted study results as acuity scores were significant and posit ive for all 
measured components of util ization. 
Health Policy and Management Impl ications 
Study results show l imited init ial effects on util ization for health plan members 
with chronic health conditions when transitioning from an HMO to a CDHP. This could 
indicate that the changes in benefit design seemed to have l imited influence on the 
behavior of individuals and there wil l  be l imited decreases in uti l ization for consumers in 
COHPs, or it  may be too early to fu l ly assess changes in uti l ization because there are 
learning effects for consumers associated with participat ing in these products. It wil l  take 
t ime for these effects to be revealed in consumer behavior change. Impl ications for 
health policy i f  utilization i s  not decreased could include l imited effects in attempting to 
decrease medical costs, especially in populations that util ize higher amounts of health 
care services. 
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The need for accurate measurement o f  consumer acuity and health status is 
paramount in  monitoring CDHPs. If higher consumer cost sharing eventually results in 
decreased uti l ization for populations with chronic health conditions, health status could 
be negati vely affected. This may not only have qual i ty of care impacts, but may also 
have rebound effects through init ial decreases in medical costs fol lowed by increased 
medical costs due to decreased population health status. 
Monitoring of mUltiple aspects of CDHPs will be necessary to understand effects 
of increased consumer cost sharing and util ization of health information. More detailed 
monitoring of which services are being affected and impacts on the full dynamics of these 
products wil l  be needed. Increased health education and case management of appropriate 
members may appropriately decrease health services util ization. Increased consumer cost 
sharing may have i mpacts to the overall economy through increased consumer debt, as 
well as impacting providers through h igher amounts of non-reimbursed care being 
rendered. Increased access to information wil l  need to be monitored for actual effects on 
both consumers and providers. 
Study Limitations 
An inherent l imitation of the study is the one year time period to measure 
differences in study and control group uti l ization and health status changes, especially 
when a health insurance product is new and evolving. True differences between 
members in HMOs and CDHPs may not manifest themselves until after longer time 
periods. Init i al impacts may not be significant in the first year of transition from HMOs 
to CDHPs. 
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Internal val idity concerns include the potential for selection bias for members 
choosing either the HMO or the CDHP. As noted previously, this bias was partial ly  
controlled for i n  the study by including only members that d id not have choice between 
the HMO and CDHP. Selection bias could exist at the employer group decision making 
level regarding what insurance products members wil l  be offered or how the employers 
may have chosen to introduce the new products, including the extent of employee 
education regarding the products. 
S tudy external val idity concerns include the application of study results to d isease 
condit ions other than heart fai lure, diabetes and coronary artery disease and to older 
populations. It is noted that the study population was in the age range of 1 8-64, and 
appl icabil ity of study resu lts to older populations may need to be verified by replicating 
the study for an older population. 
The inabil i ty to compare 2006 and 2007 acu i ty scores in  the study groups 
h ighlights the complexit ies and l imitations in using claims data to measure health status. 
Claims measurement of health status in the study was based on member ut i l ization of 
health services for the prior year. Measurement of health status through claims data that 
are based on member health services uti l ization may underestimate actual member acuity 
i f  financial incentives to decrease member uti l ization, such as higher deductibles and 
coinsurance, are introduced. 
Considerations for Future Studies 
The problems encountered in measurement of member acuity based on claims 
data ind icates the need for use of better measurements of health status. In addit ion to the 
use of claims data, future studies should incorporate health risk assessments and/or 
surveys to measure functional health status changes, attirudes and health l i teracy in 
relation to consumer knowledge and use of health information. These 
assessments/surveys could i ncorporate: 
I .  A health risk assessment to measure member functional health status such as the 
Short Form- I 2 (SF- 1 2) .  This assessment has been adopted as the standard of 
measurement by key government agencies, including the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality. 
2. Surveys to measure changes in  health care providers as reported by the member. 
3. Surveys to measure member use of health care information as reported by the 
member. 
4. Surveys to measure member perception of having or not-having adequate access to 
health care services and/or prescribed pharmaceuticals .  
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5 .  Surveys to measure the presence of member behaviors that negatively impact chronic 
health conditions as reported by the member. Examples would include smoking, 
alcohol use and/or obesity. 
6. Assessments to measure health l i teracy, such as a l ist of questions as a proxy for the 
Short-Form Test of Functional Health Literacy (S-TOFHLA). 
While this study measured init ial impacts of members transitioning from HMOs 
to COHPs,  more longitudinal studies are needed to ascertain potential long-term effects 
of higher cost sharing in populations with chronic health conditions. These longitudinal 
studies would monitor util ization of health services and health status over at least a two to 
three year t ime period, and would include the application to single chronic health 
conditions with impacts of co-morbidity. 
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Closing 
This study has attempted to measure init ial impacts of the health industry 
transition from managed competition to consumer driven health plans .  Specifically,  the 
study focused on members with chronic health conditions of congestive heart failure, 
diabetes and coronary artery disease who transitioned from an HMO to CDHPs. The 
study was l imited in not being able to measure what was intended in its original scope, in 
that portions of the data were not avai lable. The study was also l imited to measuring 
potential impacts over an initial one year t ime period. 
More study is  needed to understand impacts to populations with chronic health 
conditions. Understanding the impacts on people with chronic diseases and the 
implications for population ut i l ization of health services and health status will provide 
valuable information for future planning for both commercial insurance carriers and 
potential adoption of these models in government programs. This research wil l  be 
especial l y  useful if these insurance models are introduced in the elderly population where 
chronic disease conditions are more prevalent. 
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Appendix I 
Diagnoses Comprising Member Health Condjtions 
Congestive Heart Failure 
(CHF) 
Diabetes Mellitus (DM) 
Coronary Artery Disease 
(CAD) 
• H ypertensive Heart Disease 
• Diseases of the Endocardium 
• Chronic Pulmonary Heart Disease 
• Cardiomyopathy 
• Heart Failure 
• Diabetes Mellitus 
• Diabetes with Ketoacidosis 
• Diabetes with H yperosmolarity 
• Diabetes with Other Coma 
• Diabetes with Renal Manifestations 
• Diabetes with Opthalmic Manifestations 
• Diabetes with Neurological Man i festations 
• Diabetes with Peripheral Circulatory Disorders 
• Diabetes with Other Specified Man i festations 
• Diabetes with U . fied Com cations 
• Coronary Atherosclerosis 
• Acute M yocardial Infarction 
• Angina Pectoris 
• Ischemic Heart Disease 
• Conduction Disorders 
• Cardiac hmias 
- � �.�, Age 
Gender 
Estimated Household lncome 
Estimated Individual Net 
Worth 
Individual Deductible 
Household Deductible 
Coinsurance 
2006 Retrospective Risk 
Score 
Appendix 2 
Correlation Between lndependent Variables 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient Measurement 
flit : i Pea.- CornIatIoa CGdIieiail -_i; -� . - ':i.'-:" c ·'£ ' 
· Gender - .019 
· Estimated Household Income - .008 
· Estimated lndividual Net Wonh ·.0 1 3  
· lndividual Deductible -.033" 
· Household Deductible-.032" 
· Coinsurance -.045·· 
· 2006 Relrospective Risk Score .044·· 
· Age -.0 1 9  
· Estimated Household lncome -.001 
· Estimated lndividual Net Wonh -.0 1 6  
· Individual Deductible - .0 1 2  
· Household Deductible - .0 1 3  
· Coinsurance -.008 
· 2006 Retrospective Risk Score -.022 
· Age -.008 
· Gender -.001 
· Estimated lndividual Net Worth .559' 
· Individual Deductible -.030' 
· Household Deductible -.033" 
· Coinsurance -.029· 
· 2006 Retrospective Risk Score -.024' 
· Age -.0 1 3  
· Gender - .0 1 6  
· Esti mated Individual Household Income .559" 
· Individual Deductible -.01 8 
· Household Deductible -.024 
· Coinsurance -.020 
· 2006 Relrospective Risk Score -.0 1 6  
· Age -.033" 
· Gender - .0 1 2  
· Esti mated Individual Household Income -.030 
· Esti mated Individual Net Worth - .0 1 8  
· Household Deductible .953** 
· Coinsurance .82 3 * *  
· 2006 Retrospective Risk Score - .065'* 
· Age -.032" 
· Gender - .0 1 3  
· Estimated Individual Household lneome -.033 ' *  
· Estimated lndividual Net Worth -.024 
· Individual Deductible .953'* 
· Coinsurance .907*· 
· 2006 Ret rospective Risk Score -.069** 
· Age -.045*' 
· Gender - .008 
· Esti mated Individual Household Income -.029* 
· Esti mated Individual Net Worth - .020 
· Household Deductible .907 * *  
· Individual Deductible .823** 
· 2006 Retrospective Risk Score -.076** 
· Age -.044 *' 
· Gender -.022 
· Estimated Individual Household Income -.024* 
· Esti mated Individual Net Worth -.0 1 6  
· Household Deductible - .069 * *  
· Individual Deductible -.065* *  
· Coinsurance -.076*-
. .  Correlallon IS slgmficant at the om level (2-talied) 
, Correlation is Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
1 1 6 
(l.YiIw T;;o: ,_  
· . 1 28 
· .491 
· .276 
· .008 
· 
.009 
· 
.000 
· 
.000 
· . 1 28 
· .996 
· 1 84 
· .340 
· .304 
· .526 
· .074 
· .491 
· .966 
· 
.000 
· .01 3  
· .006 
· . 0 1 9  
· .049 
· .276 
· . 1 84 
· 
.000 
· . 1 32 
· .053 
· . 1 07 
· .200 
· .008 
· .340 
· .01 3 
· . 1 32 
· 000 
· 
.000 
· 
. 000 
· 
.009 
· .304 
· .006 
· .053 
· 
.000 
· .000 
· .000 
· 
.000 
· .526 
· .01 9 
· . 1 07 
· .000 
· 
.000 
· .000 
· 
.000 
· .074 
· .049 
· .200 
· .000 
· 
.000 
· 
.000 
1 1 7 
Appendix 3 
2006 Retrospective Risk Score Analysis 
2006 Retrospective Risk Score � 1 .0: Pairwise Comparison for S igllificant Product 
G . f U T . rou pmgs or tl  IzatlOn 
H 
�  
,
tt Grouping 
I ' Comparison Mean Significance 
,-! Variable Grouping Difference P-Value 
I ' f i<' Variables 
Outpatient SG2 CG -7 . 1 1 3 .000 
Procedure SG I -6.999 .002 
2006 Retrospective Risk Score � 1 .0: Pairwise Comparison of Average Total Allowed 
Amounts 
I' «11�1it AblOunt 
�iild Grouping 
Comparison .'.' I " /  Mean Difference Significance 
Grouping P-Value 
Variable Variables 
Allowed Amount CG - 1 04.72453 .99 1 
Without SG I -498.20533 . 879 
Independent 
Variables - Tukey 
HSD / S2 
Al lowed Amount CG 243 1 . 1 37 . 384 
With Independent SG I 1 903.034 .478 
Variables / S2 
2006 Retrospective Risk Score ? 2.0: Pairwise Comparison of Average Total Allowed 
Amounts 
AUowed Amount Comparison Mean Difference Significance 
and Grouping Grouping P-Value 
.:' Variable Variables 
Allowed Amount CG -2430.20849 .228 
Without SG I - 1 806.22 1 8  .623 
Independent 
Variables - Tukey 
HSD / S2 
Al lowed Amount CG -998.982 .822 
With Independent SG I -754. 1 1 7 .859 
Variables / S2 
II 
1 1 8 
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